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I. THE CONCEPT OF COMMENCEMENT
This Article is appropriately titled "Being and Nothingness" since
the metaphysical notion of existence is the key to understanding the
concept of commencement. Very simply put, no judgment, not even a
judgment of dismissal, can have any validity unless the civil action in
which it is entered has come into existence as a civil action.' As a general
' Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954), exemplifies this proposi-
tion. The plaintiff attempted to commence an action in Lorain County, but the action failed
of commencement because the defendant was never served with a summons. When it be-
came apparent to the trial court that the defendant had not been served, it entered an order
stating that the action was "dismissed without prejudice at plaintiffs cost." Id. at 380, 119
N.E.2d at 286. Within a year from that dismissal, the plaintiff attempted to commence an
action in Cuvahoga County, under the provisions of Oano REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page
1981), the "savings statute," which, in substance, provides that a new action on the same
claim may be brought within one year when a previous action "fails otherwise than on the
merits." In the second action, the defendant moved to quash the service and to dismiss the
action because it was not brought within the two year statute of limitations. The trial court
overruled the motions and after a trial on the merits, entered judgment for the plaintiff.
The court of appeals affirmed, but the supreme court reversed, holding that since the first
action never came into existence, there was no action that could be "dismissed," and that as
a consequence, the first action did not "fail otherwise than on the merits" because there was
no action in existence that could "fail." As the supreme court stated:
As to the petition which was filed in Lorain county on May 29, 1950 (one day
before the expiration of two years from the date of the accident), there was no
service of summons. Therefore, it cannot be said that an action was ever deemed
[Vol. 33:245
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss2/5
OHIO CIVIL RULES 3(A) AND 4(E)
rule, a civil action comes into existence at the moment of commencement,
and it ceases to exist as an action when the court journalizes a final judg-
ment that adjudicates the rights of all of the parties and determines all of
the claims involved in the action.2 With the court's journalization, the
judgment comes into existence and takes the place of the civil action,
which ceases to exist. To put it in other words, the action merges with the
judgment, and the action no longer has any separate existence of its own.
Thus, a civil action either has being as such, or it is a nothingness, and as
a nothingness, it cannot support any judgment or order; anything done in
a civil action that fails of commencement is void and a nullity.3
Because the action comes into existence with commencement, it is im-
portant to define that precise moment in time when the action is deemed
to have commenced. That is the task of Civil Rule 3(A)," which states: "A
to be commenced in Lorain county. In other words, notwithstanding the filing of
the petition and the issuance of summons, no case ever matured in Lorain county
to the point where the court had any jurisdiction over the defendant or had any
power to make any order based upon the allegations of the petition so filed. There
was no pending case to be "dismissed." Although on the Lorain county court
docket there appears the words, "dismissed without prejudice," what the court did
was merely to strike the petition from the files. It is common knowledge that after
service of summons and even after the filing of an answer a case may be "dis-
missed" for want of prosecution. Such would be a genuine dismissal because such
case would he pending and the court would have jurisdiction over it. It seems
axiomatic that a nonexistent case can not be dismissed. In the present instance,
for lack of service, no case came into existence in Lorain county. Therefore, as to
the petition filed in Lorain county we hold that the plaintiff did not fail "other-
wise than upon the merits." The plaintiff simply never had a pending case in
Lorain county.
161 Ohio St. at 383-84, 119 N.E.2d at 288.
2 Although a civil action normally "dies" with the entry of a final judgment, it may be
"resurrected" by a timely motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for a
new trial, a motion for relief from judgment, or a timely appeal. If any of these motions are
granted by the trial court, or if a reviewing court reverses the trial court's judgment in whole
or in part, the civil action is revived to the extent necessary to comply with the order grant-
ing the motion, or to the extent necessary to comply with the reviewing court's mandate on
remand to the trial court.
2 While this statement is true with respect to any order or judgment affecting the mer-
its of the civil action, it may not be entirely true with respect to any order or judgment not
going to the merits. Because the Ohio system has linked the concept of commencement with
the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, there exists an anomalous
quasi-action known as an "action attempted to be commenced." See infra text accompany-
ing notes 216-19. Orders or judgments not affecting the merits entered in an "action at-
tempted to be commenced" are neither void nor a nullity. Thus, for example, an "action
attempted to be commenced" may be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person, or
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., OHio REV. CODE ANN. 2305.19 (Page 1981),
which speaks of an action "attempted to be commenced" failing "otherwise than upon the
merits." For a more complete discussion of an "action attempted to be commenced," see
section IV of this Article.
' OIo R. Civ. P. 3(A). Specific Ohio Civil Rules are hereinafter generally referred to as
"Civil Rule" or "Rule."
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civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court, if service
is obtained within one year from such filing." Unfortunately, for reasons
that are more historical than rational, this formula links the relatively
simple concept of commencement (the filing of the complaint with the
court) to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant;
this linkage has produced a number of unnecessary complications.' These
complications will be discussed in some detail in subsequent sections of
this Article, but is must be emphasized here that the approach to these
problems, and the correct solution to them, cannot be fully understood
unless one first grasps the basic concept that a civil action, as such, must
have a real, albeit incorporeal, existence. Being or nothingness, to be or
not to be, that is the principal question with which we must deal when we
consider the concept of commencement.
II. COMMENCEMENT AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In pertinent part, section 2305.03 of the Ohio Revised Code provides:
"A civil action . . . can be commenced only within the period prescribed
in sections 2305.03 to 2305.22, inclusive, of the Revised Code. When inter-
posed by proper plea by a party to an action mentioned in such sections,
lapse of time shall be a bar thereto."6 This language has produced some
confusion, suggesting as it does, that an action cannot be commenced be-
yond the statutory period of limitations. That suggestion, however, is in-
correct. While the concept of commencement and the concept of the stat-
ute of limitations bar are intimately connected, they are two separate and
distinct concepts, and to properly understand the application of each, the
distinction between the two concepts must constantly be kept in mind.
As far as commencement is concerned, an action is commenced when-
ever the requirements of Rule 3(A) are met; this is true even if the appli-
cable statutory period of limitations has expired before the complaint is
filed with the court. Suppose, for example, that an automobile collision
resulting in personal injury and property damage occurs on August 1,
1984. Putting aside all questions of tolling, etc., the statutory period of
limitations applicable to an action for that personal injury and property
damage will expire on August 1, 1986.7 Suppose further that the injured
party files his complaint for personal injury and property damage on Au-
gust 6, 1986, and yalid service is obtained on September 28, 1986. In such
For a survey of the historical development of Civil Rule 3(A) and a discussion of the
problems it has produced, see Scigliano, Failure of Commencement, The Forgotten De-
fense-A Comment on Ohio Civil Rule 3(A), 16 AKRON L. REv. 265 (1982). See also Browne,
Some Problems with Proposed Civil Rule 4(E), 55 CLEV. B.J. 164 (1984).
Otno REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.03 (Page 1981).
See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.10 (Page 1981), which provides that "[a]n action for
bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the cause
thereof arose."
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a case, since service was obtained within one year following the filing of
the complaint, the date of service relates back to the date on which the
complaint was filed, 8 and the action is deemed commenced as of August
6, 1986. However, even though it was commenced, recovery on the claim
will be barred by the running of the applicable statute of limitations (as-
suming that the defense is properly asserted) because it was not com-
menced on or before August 1, 1986.1 The running of the statute of limi-
tations had no effect on the commencement of the action, but did affect
recovery on the claim. In fact, the date of commencement is immaterial
for commencement purposes and becomes material only when the defense
of the bar of the statute of limitations is properly pleaded. Accordingly,
when section 2305.03 states that a civil action can be commenced only
within the statutory period of limitations, it means that in order to avoid
the bar of the statute of limitations the action must be commenced before
the statutory period expires. It does not mean that an action cannot be
commenced after the expiration of the statutory period of limitations. In-
deed, in the above example, if the defendant had not properly pleaded
the statute of limitations defense, the action not only would have been
commenced on August 6, 1986, but recovery on the claim would not be
barred by the running of the statute.1"
Note, too, that because commencement and limitations are separate
and distinct concepts, the running of the statute of limitations has no
effect on the year in which to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. Suppose, in the example above, that the complaint was filed
on July 31, 1986, and service was obtained on the defendant on Septem-
ber 28, 1986, more than two years after the collision occurred. The action
is still deemed to have commenced as of July 31, 1986-within the two
year statutory period-even though jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant was acquired after the statute of limitations had expired. The
one year in Rule 3(A) during which jurisdiction may be obtained over the
person of the defendant is completely independent of and not affected by
the two year statute of limitations applicable to this particular case. 1'
While the expiration of the statutory period of limitations does not re-
duce the Rule's one year period in which to obtain jurisdiction over the
I See St. Thomas Hosp. v. Beal, 2 Ohio App. 3d 132, 132, 440 N.E.2d 1240, 1241 (9th
Dist. 1981)(Summit County): "If service is obtained within one year of filing, that case is
commenced on the date of filing for purposes of the statute of limitations."
' Collins v. State, No. 82AP-370 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1983)(Franklin
County); Williams v. Jerry L. Kaltenbach Enters., Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d 113, 440 N.E.2d 1219
(1st Dist. 1981)(Hamilton County).
"I Otno REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.03 (Page 1981), provides that the statute of limitations is
a defense to an action only when lapse of time is "interposed by proper plea by a party to an
action."
" Fieno v. Beaton, 68 Ohio App. 2d 13, 426 N.E.2d 203 (1st Dist. 1980)(Harmilton
County).
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person of the defendant, neither does the nonexpiration of the statute of
limitations expand that period beyond one year from the filing of the
complaint. Again, suppose an automobile collision on August 1, 1984.
This time, the complaint is filed on September 1, 1984, but service on the
defendant is not obtained until October 5, 1985, more than one year after
the complaint was filed, but well within the two year period of limita-
tions. In this case, because service was not obtained within one year fol-
lowing the filing of the complaint, the date of service does not relate back
to the date on which the complaint was filed.12 The action fails of com-
mencement because the requirements of Civil Rule 3(A) were not met,"
even though the statute of limitations had not yet expired on the date of
service. In situations such as this, proper procedure requires the filing of
a new complaint, not an amended complaint, before the statute of limita-
tions expires and a new service on the defendant. If the new service is
obtained within a year following the filing of the new complaint, the ac-
tion will be commenced as of the date the new complaint was filed. 4
To summarize, all that is required for commencement purposes is the
filing of a complaint with the court and the acquisition of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant within one year thereafter. For purposes
of the statute of limitations, the complaint must be filed with the court
before the applicable statute of limitations expires, and jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant must be acquired within one year from the
filing of the complaint.
III. THE ELEMENTS OF COMMENCEMENT
Both Civil Rule 3(A) and section 2305.17 of the Ohio Revised Code de-
1" St. Thomas Hosp. v. Beal, 2 Ohio App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 1240 (9th Dist. 1981)(Sum-
mit County); Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 419 N.E.2d 1117 (8th Dist.
1979)(Cuyahoga County).
1" Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St. 3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984); Barnhart v. Schultz, 53
Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978), rev'd on other grounds, Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio
St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983); Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63, 362 N.E.2d 642 (1977);
Saunders v. Choi, No. 45101 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), aff'd,
12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984); Pistner v. Baxter, 2 Ohio App. 3d 69, 440 N.E.2d
812 (I0th Dist. 1981)(Franklin County); Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 419 N.E.2d
1117 (8th Dist. 1979)(Cuyahoga County); Dirker v. Seven Up Bottling Co., No. 9223 (Ohio
9th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 1, 1979)(Summit County).
Not all courts, however, have recognized the distinction between the one year period for
obtaining jurisdiction over the defendant and the statutory period of limitations. Thus, in
St. Thomas Hosp. v. Beal, the Court of Appeals for Summit County held that an action was
commenced as of the date of service on the defendant when service occurred more than one
year after the complaint was filed but prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. 2
Ohio App. 3d at 132, 440 N.E.2d at 1241. This conclusion is not warranted by anything said
in Rule 3(A), its statutory predecessor Ouio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.17 (Page 1981), or prior
judicial decisions, and it is of doubtful validity.
" Lombardo v. Calabrese, No. 44520 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1982)(Cuyahoga
County).
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fine "commencement," and it has been said that the Rule must be read in
pari materia with the statute.15 Therefore, any discussion of the elements
of commencement requires a comparison between the two:
Civil Rule 3(A): Section 2305.17:
A civil action is commenced by An action is commenced [for
filing a complaint with the court, statute of limitations purposes]
if service is obtained within one by filing a petition in the office
year from such filing. '  of the clerk of the proper court
together with a praecipe
demanding that summons issue
or an affidavit for service by
publication, if service is obtained
within one year.17
While it has been said that "[Civil Rule] 3(A) is substantially the same
as R.C. 2305.17,'' 18 there are obvious differences between them. Despite
these differences, section 1 of amended House Bill No. 1201, which indi-
cates the statutory sections superseded by the Ohio Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, does not expressly repeal the statute. Furthermore, section 3 of that
Act provides: "The failure to repeal or amend any other section estab-
lishes no evidence concerning its conflict with [the civil] rules.' 9 Thus,
the question becomes: To what extent are the disparate elements of sec-
tion 2305.17 in full force and effect, and to what extent have they been
impliedly repealed by the provisions of Civil Rule 3(A)? 20 The following
subsections will attempt to answer this question."
15 St. Thomas Hosp. v. Beal, 2 Ohio App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 1240 (9th Dist. 1981)(Sum-
mit County).
O i0o R. Civ. P. 3(A).
17 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.17 (Page 1981).
Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 67 n.4, 419 N.E.2d 1117, 1119 n.4 (8th Dist.
1979)(Cuyahoga County).
" See Act of June 17, 1970, § 3, 1970 Ohio Laws 3021.
o The Ohio Constitution provides, in pertinent part: "The supreme court shall prescribe
rules governing practice and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not
abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right .... All laws in conflict with such rules
shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect." OHIO CONST. art. IV,
§ 5. Accordingly, a procedural statute in effect on July 1, 1970 when the Ohio Rules of Civil
Procedure became effective is impliedly repealed to the extent that its provisions conflict
with the provisions of a Civil Rule. Since Civil Rule 3(A) defines commencement, it may be
assumed that the definition of commencement is procedural rather than substantive. There-
fore, § 2305.17 is a procedural statute rather than one which establishes a substantive right,
and it is subject to the implied repeal provisions of article IV, § 5(B).
" Most of the decisions that have discussed both the statute and the Rule tend to ignore
the differences between them, and thus they avoid the question. See Gentile v. Carr, 4 Ohio
App. 3d 55, 464 N.E.2d 477 (7th Dist. 1981)(Jefferson County); Scott v. Orlando, 2 Ohio
App. 3d 333, 442 N.E.2d 96 (6th Dist. 1981)(Lucas County); St. Thomas Hosp. v. Beal, 2
Ohio App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 1240 (9th Dist. 1981)(Summit County). In Conway v. Smith,
66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 419 N.E.2d 1117 (8th Dist. 1979)(Cuyahoga County), the question did
1984-851
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A. Filing a Complaint with the Court
1. A Civil Action
While Civil Rule 3(A) states that it is applicable to "civil actions," sec-
tion 2305.17 speaks only of "actions." This difference does not indicate a
distinction; in civil litigation, all "actions"22 are "civil actions. '' 3 How-
ever, since Rule 3(A) is automatically applicable to all civil actions
through the provisions of Civil Rule 1(A), the reference to a "civil action"
in Rule 3(A) is redundant, unless its inclusion was meant as a signal that
Rule 3(A) was not to be applied to special proceedings. 2 4 If that was the
intention of the supreme court when it drafted Rule 3(A), it has not al-
ways been followed. There is a body of authority, both direct and by way
of dictum, that Civil Rule 3(A) is applicable to those special proceedings
that are adversary in nature and which require the service of a sum-
mons,2 5 but is not applicable to those special proceedings that do not re-
arise, but the court was able to avoid dealing with it because the plaintiff had complied with
the requirements of the statute, and all parties to the appeal based their arguments on the
language of Civil Rule 3(A) alone. Id. at 67 n.4, 419 N.E.2d at 1119 n.4. Accordingly, there is
no clear-cut decision on the continuing force and effect of the statutory provisions relating
to commencement.
The Advisory Committee Staff Note to Civil Rule 3(A) affords very little guidance on this
point. In pertinent part, it states: "Unlike § 2305.17, R.C., Rule 3(A) does not require a
praecipe or an affidavit for service by publication as a requirement for commencing a civil
action." OHIO R. Civ. P. 3(A) advisory committee note (1970). This suggests that the prae-
cipe and affidavit requirements of the statute are no longer of any force or effect, but it very
carefully avoids any express statement to that effect.
22 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.01 (Page 1981), defines an action as "an ordinary pro-
ceeding in a court of justice, involving process, pleadings, and ending in a judgment or de-
cree, by which a party prosecutes another for the redress of a legal wrong, enforcement of a
legal right, or the punishment of a public offense."
2 OHIo R. Civ. P. 2 states: "There shall be only one form of action, and it shall be
known as a civil action."
24 In pertinent part, OHio R. Civ. P. 1(C) states:
These rules, to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplica-
ble, shall not apply to procedure. . . (7) in all other special statutory proceedings;
provided, that where any statute provides for procedure by a general or specific
reference to the statutes governing procedure in civil actions such procedure shall
be in accordance with these rules.
The general rule to be drawn from this language is that the Civil Rules do not provide the
procedure to be followed in special statutory proceedings. Rule 3(A)'s reference to a "civil
action" could be read to mean that Civil Rule 3(A) falls within this general rule and not
within Rule 1(C)'s exceptions.
26 See Proctor v. Giles, 12 Ohio Op. 3d 74, (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1979)(Hamilton County),
rev,d on other grounds, 61 Ohio St. 2d 211, 400 N.E.2d 393 (1980); Lysaght v. Dollison, 61
Ohio App. 2d 59, 399 N.E.2d 121 (1st Dist. 1978)(Hamilton County); Carter v. Johnson, 55
Ohio App. 2d 157, 380 N.E.2d 758 (8th Dist. 1978)(Cuyahoga County); Yancey v. Pyles, 44
Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist. 1975)(Hamilton County). See also Beverly v.
Beverly, 33 Ohio App. 2d 199, 215, 293 N.E.2d 562, 572 (6th Dist. 1973)(Erie
[Vol. 33:245
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quire the service of a summons.2" The language of Civil Rule 1(C) can
sustain this result.
27
2. Filing
Again, on the matter of filing, there is a difference between the Rule
and the statute, but this time, it may be a difference with a distinction.
Civil Rule 3(A) requires the complaint to be filed "with the court," while
section 2305.17 requires the complaint to be filed "in the office of the
clerk of the ...court."2 " Civil Rule 5(E) defines "filing." It first states
that "pleadings and other papers ... shall" be filed "with the clerk of
the court." To this extent, Civil Rules 3(A) and 5(E) are in complete har-
mony with section 2305.17. However, the second clause of Rule 5(E) per-
mits filing of "the papers" with the judge provided that he has given his
permission. "The papers" mentioned in this clause can be read in two
ways. If it is contrasted with the phrase "pleadings and other papers," as
used in the first clause, it can be read restrictively, so that it precludes
the filing of "pleadings" with the judge. On the other hand, if the phrase,
"the papers," is not contrasted with "pleadings and other papers," it can
be read expansively to include all pleadings, motions, and other papers.29
If the restrictive reading is adopted, the Rule and the statute remain in
harmony; if the expansive reading is adopted, then there exists a conflict
between Civil Rule 3(A) and section 2305.17, since Rule 3(A), when read
in conjunction with Rule 5(E), would permit the filing of the complaint
with the judge rather than only with the clerk. Neither the Rules Advi-
sory Committee Staff Note to Rule 5(E)30 nor any reported decision re-
solves this problem. Nevertheless, Rule 3(A)'s broad reference to filing
with the court, rather than the statute's narrow reference to filing in the
office of the clerk, suggests that Rule 3(A)'s concept of "filing" encom-
passes both clauses of Civil Rule 5(E). That being so, the second clause of
Rule 5(E) must be read expansively; thus, there is a conflict between Civil
Rule 3(A) and section 2305.17. Under the principle of primacy, 1 that con-
County)(Brown, J., concurring)(application of Rule 15(C) in an action testing the validity of
a will); Gibbs v. Lemley, 33 Ohio App. 2d 220, 222, 293 N.E.2d 324, 325 (4th Dist.
1972)(Lawrence County)(Stephenson, J., dissenting)(Rules 4 and 10 applied to will contest
proceeding).
"' State ex rel. Civil Rights Comm'n v. Gunn, 45 Ohio St. 2d 262, 344 N.E.2d 327 (1976).
"7 See supra note 24. Depending on the language of the statute authorizing a special
proceeding requiring service of a summons, Civil Rule 3(A) is applicable because it is not, by
its nature, clearly inapplicable (the first exception in Rule 1(C)) or because the statute
makes reference to the procedure used in civil actions (the second exception in Rule I(C)).
"' OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.17 (Page 1981).
"9 See the discussion in Scigliano, supra note 5, at 271.
" The Staff Note simply states: "Rule 5(E) defines the act of filing pleadings and other
papers." This does suggest, however, that despite the difference in language, both clauses of
Civil Rule 5(E) deal with the filing of pleadings as well as other papers.
" See Browne, Civil Rule 1 and the Principle of Primacy-A Guide to the Resolution of
1984-85]
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flict must be resolved in favor of the Rule, it must be concluded that the
statutory restriction of filing in the office of the clerk has been impliedly
repealed.2
In any event, the complaint is not filed within the meaning of either
the Rule or the statute unless and until it comes into the actual posses-
sion, custody, and control of the clerk or the judge; merely mailing the
complaint to the court for filing is not sufficient.33 Furthermore, this ac-
tual possession, custody, and control must also be a knowing possession,
custody, and control; the clerk or the judge must be aware of the docu-
ment's presence and must assume responsibility for it. 4 As a general rule,
the clerk's filing stamp on the complaint" or the judge's notation on it3"
is the best evidence that it has been filed; in some cases, however, a dock-
et entry reflecting its filing will suffice.17
3. A Complaint
On this matter, the difference between the Rule and the statute is
purely one of terminology; the Rule's "complaint" replaces the statute's
"petition." The question that remains, however, is what is a complaint for
commencement purposes? It has been held that a document that does not
meet the formal and substantive requirements of the Civil Rules cannot
be deemed an answer. 38 Logically, this same rationale should apply to all
Conflicts Between Statutes and the Civil Rules, 5 OHio N.U.L. REv. 363 (1978).
a See supra note 20.
Bohacek v. Administrator, No. 45090 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 17,
1983)(Cuyahoga County); Douthitt v. Garrison, 3 Ohio App. 3d 254, 444 N.E.2d 1068 (9th
Dist. 1981)(Summit County); Fazio v. Board of Review, No. 42989 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App.
May 21, 1981)(Cuyahoga County); Oravecz v. Board of Review, No. 42836 (Ohio 8th Dist.
Ct. App. May 14, 1981)(Cuyahoga County); King v. Paylor, 69 Ohio App. 193, 43 N.E.2d 313
(1st Dist. 1942)(Hamilton County).
3' King v. Paylor, 69 Ohio App. 193, 43 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist. 1942)(Hamilton County).
" Westmoreland v. Valley Homes Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 291, 328 N.E.2d 406 (1975);
John H. Kappus Co. v. Markoff, No. 44163 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. July 15,
1982)(Cuyahoga County); Siebenthal v. Summers, 56 Ohio App. 2d 168, 381 N.E.2d 1344
(10th Dist. 1978)(Franklin County); Yancey v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835
(1st Dist. 1975)(Hamilton County); Seaway Taverns, Inc. v. Board of Liquor Control, 163
N.E.2d 186 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. 1959)(Franklin County); King v. Paylor, 69 Ohio App.
193, 43 N.E.2d 313 (1st Dist. 1942)(Hamilton County).
" When papers are filed with the judge, he must "note thereon the filing date and forth-
with transmit them to the office of the clerk." OHIO R. Civ. P. 5(E). If the papers are not
transmitted to the clerk's office and accepted for filing by the clerk, they are not deemed
filed even if the judge has accepted them for filing. Jeewek v. Jeewek, No. 43018 (Ohio 8th
Dist. Ct. App. May 21, 1981)(Cuyahoga County).
" Westmoreland v. Valley Homes Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 291, 328 N.E.2d 406 (1975);
King v. Paylor, 69 Ohio App. 193, 43 N.E.2d 313 (lst Dist. 1942)(Hamilton County).
" Daley & Co. v. Capizzi, No. 46967 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1984)(Cuyahoga
County); Wood County Furniture v. Baughman, No. WD-83-17 (Ohio 6th Dist. Ct. App.
Aug. 5, 1983)(Wood County); Spratt v. Frederickson, No. 38579 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App.
Apr. 26, 1979)(Cuyahoga County).
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pleadings, including a complaint. However, as one commentator notes,
this standard is too harsh for commencement purposes; a document
should be sufficient as a "complaint" if it contains three elements: the
statement of the claim or an attempted statement of the claim, the de-
mand for judgment, and an appropriate signature.3 9 This will be suffi-
cient to commence the action, since any other defects in the document
can be readily cured by amendment.
The Ohio Rule makes commencement dependent upon the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, and as a consequence, an
action must be commenced as to each defendant involved in the action. 0
Therefore, the term "complaint" as used in Rule 3(A) must be under-
stood in its generic sense; that is, it includes not only a complaint against
a defendant, but also a third party complaint. Likewise, in appropriate
cases, the term will include a counterclaim or cross-claim. No doubt this
generic use can lead to some interesting commencement problems.
Take, for example, the case of the new party defendant brought into
the suit after the filing of the original complaint. If this new party defen-
dant is an additional party defendant, then the "complaint" for Rule
3(A) purposes will be the amended complaint which first names him as a
party defendant.4' However, it is now well settled that leave of court
under the provisions of Rule 21 is required before such an amended com-
plaint can be filed.42 Accordingly, if the amended complaint is filed with-
out leave of court and if the absence of leave is raised by a motion to
strike4" or otherwise, the amended complaint will be deemed a nullity and
39 Scigliano, supra note 5, at 273-75.
40 See, for example, Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63, 362 N.E.2d 642 (1977), in which
the supreme court held that the action was commenced against the defendant who was
served within a year following the filing of the complaint, but not against the defendant who
was not served within that year. Id. at 64-65, 362 N.E.2d at 643. As a consequence, a subse-
quent action against the second defendant was barred by the statute of limitations. Lash v.
Astley, No. 79AP-477 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1980)(Franklin County).
However, the rule that the action must be commenced separately as to each defendant
apparently does not apply if an unserved defendant is merely a nominal defendant. Heuser
v. Crum, 31 Ohio St. 2d 90, 285 N.E.2d 340 (1972).
" Collins v. State, No. 82AP-370 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1983)(Franklin
County).
" Zinner v. Romberg, No. 46494 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1983)(Cuyahoga
County); Gates Towing v. Branch Motor Express, 1 Ohio App. 3d 149, 440 N.E.2d 61 (10th
Dist. 1981)(Franklin County); Bell v. Coen, 48 Ohio App. 2d 325, 357 N.E.2d 392 (9th Dist.
1975)(Summit County); Vickers, Procedural Defenses Available to the New-Party Defen-
dant: The Necessity of Obtaining Leave to Amend and Relation Back, 17 AKRON L. REV. 9,
23 (1983).
" Zinner v. Romberg, No. 46494 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 27, 1983)(Cuyahoga
County). If the defendant does not challenge the plaintiff's failure to obtain leave before
filing the amended complaint, the plaintiff's failure is waived, and the filing of the amended
complaint will commence the action, all other things being equal. Lombardo v. Calabrese,
No. 44520 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1982)(Cuyahoga County).
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not part of the pleadings at all.44 In such a case, the action against the
new party defendant will fail of commencement for want of a "com-
plaint."" Conversely, if the amended complaint is filed with leave of
court, and jurisdiction is acquired over the person of the defendant
within one year thereafter, the action against the new party defendant
will be deemed commenced as of the date the amended complaint was
filed.4" The same basic rules apply when a new party defendant is
brought in as a substitute defendant under the provisions of Civil Rule
15(C), except that the date of commencement will differ. In the case of
substitution under Rule 15(C), the amended complaint is deemed to re-
late back to the original complaint, so that the date of commencement
vis-a-vis the new party substitute defendant will be the date the original
complaint was filed with the court."7
Many of the same problems attend the amendment bringing in a new
party plaintiff. First, there is the need for leave to do so under Civil Rule
21.48 Next, one must inquire as to the new party plaintiffs relationship to
the original claim. If the new party plaintiff is a real party in interest
with respect to the original claim, then the amended complaint bringing
in the new party relates back to the original complaint, and the action of
the new party plaintiff is deemed commenced by and at the time of the
filing of the original complaint."9 However, if the new party is not a real
party in interest with respect to the original claim, then his claim is sepa-
rate and distinct from the original claim and, for all practical purposes, a
separate action which must be commenced in its own right. Obviously,
the "complaint" which commences this action will be the amended com-
plaint naming the new party plaintiff.50
As a general rule, counterclaims and cross-claims present no com-
mencement problems, since the action was commenced by the filing of
the plaintiffs complaint, and the court has jurisdiction over all of the
"' Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St. 3d 154, 159, 464 N.E.2d 538, 543 (1984)(C. Brown, J.,
dissenting); Miller v. Lint, 62 Ohio St. 2d 209, 404 N.E.2d 752 (1980); Westmoreland v.
Valley Homes Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 291, 328 N.E.2d 406 (1975).
" Zinner v. Romberg, No. 46494, slip op. at 9-11 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 27,
1983)(Cuyahoga County).
" Collins v. State, No. 82AP-370, slip op. at 6 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 6,
1983)(Franklin County).
41 Jack Davis Painting Co. v. Eller Enters., Inc., 8 Ohio App. 3d 211, 456 N.E.2d 1274
(10th Dist. 1982)(Franklin County).
"' See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
" See the last sentence of Omio R. Civ. P. 17(A) which states: "Such ratification, joinder,
or substitution shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name
of the real party in interest."
o Whether a new service of process is required on this additional claim is not entirely
clear. It has been held that no new service is necessary if an action has already been com-
menced against the defendant, and the claim of the new party plaintiff arises out of the
conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth in the original complaint. Smith v. Red & Yel-
low Cab Co., No. L-81-178 (Ohio 6th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1981)(Lucas County).
[Vol. 33:245
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss2/5
OHIO CIVIL RULES 3(A) AND 4(E)
parties involved. However, a commencement situation does arise when
the pleader attempts to bring in a new party defendant in response to the
counterclaim or cross-claim under the provisions of Civil Rule 13(H). In
such case, the "complaint" which commences the action against the new
party defendant is the answer which contains the counterclaim or cross-
claim. Whether leave of court under the provisions of Civil Rule 21 is
required in such cases is an open question in Ohio, but since Civil Rule
13(H) is more specific than Civil Rule 21 and does not require leave of
court, leave should not be necessary. However, leave of court under the
provisions of Civil Rule 15(A) and/or 13(F) may be required to add the
counterclaim or cross-claim if the counterclaim or cross-claim was not in-
cluded in the original answer. Normally such leave is not required if the
pleader can amend the answer as a matter of course under the provisions
of Rule 15(A);"' otherwise, the omitted counterclaim or cross-claim can
only be added with leave of court or the written consent of the adverse
party.2 Of course, if the omitted counterclaim is a compulsory counter-
claim, and it is too late to amend as a matter of course, leave of court to
add the compulsory counterclaim by way of an amendment to the answer
is always required. 3 Likewise, leave of court is always required if an af-
ter-acquired counterclaim is to be added by way of a supplement to the
answer. 4 Thus, the counterclaim or cross-claim against a new party de-
fendant will fail of commencement as to that new party defendant if
leave of court is required and not obtained before the filing of the amend-
ment or supplement to the answer.s5
Unlike the counterclaim and cross-claim, which are asserted in a re-
sponsive pleading, 6 the third party claim must be asserted in its own
" National City Bank v. Fleming, 2 Ohio App. 3d 50, 440 N.E.2d 590 (8th Dist.
1981)(Cuyahoga County); Browne, Compulsory Counterclaims and the Problem of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, 56 OHIO ST. B.A. REP. 688, 690 (1983).
52 OHIo R. Civ. P. 15(A). Cf. Hoover v. Sumlin, 12 Ohio St. 3d 1, 5, 465 N.E.2d 377, 381
(1984)(leave to amend answer to raise affirmative defense should be "freely given" under
Rule 15(A)).
" OHIO R. CIv. P. 13(F). See National City Bank v. Fleming, 2 Ohio App. 3d 50, 54, 440
N.E.2d 590, 596 (8th Dist. 1981)(Cuyahoga County); Rosenberg v. Gattarello, 49 Ohio App.
2d 87, 92, 359 N.E.2d 467, 470 (8th Dist. 1976)(Cuyahoga County).
" See OHIo R. Civ. P. 13(E), 15(E).
" Under the appropriate circumstances, leave of court may be implied. Thus, if the trial
court refuses to grant a motion to strike an omitted counterclaim filed without leave of
court, the denial of the motion to strike implies the grant of leave to file the omitted coun-
terclaim. See National City Bank v. Fleming, 2 Ohio App. 3d 50, 54, 440 N.E.2d 590, 596
(8th Dist. 1981)(Cuyahoga County). Whether this concept of implied rulings on motions is
consistent with the requirements of Civil Rule 58 governing entry of judgment is a matter
that has yet to be decided.
" See OHIO R. Cxv. P. 12(A)(2), 13(A), 13(G). See also Behrle v. Beam, 6 Ohio St. 3d 41,
45 n.1, 451 N.E.2d 237, 240 n.1 (1983)(compulsory counterclaim, even in amount over mone-
tary jurisdiction of a municipal court, must be pleaded in a responsive pleading to that
court); Browne, supra note 51, at 701-02 (same).
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separate pleading-the third party complaint."7 Therefore, the third
party complaint is the "complaint" needed to commence a third party
action. Once again, however, there may be leave of court problems that
affect the commencement of the third party action. The third party com-
plaint may be filed as a matter of right if it is filed with the court within
fourteen days after the service of the original responsive pleading, but
thereafter, it may be filed only with leave of court."6 If such leave of court
is not obtained and the absence of leave is challenged, the third party
complaint is illegally on file, is not a part of the pleadings, and is a nul-
lity. " In such a case, of course, the third party action would not be com-
menced since there is no "complaint" on file with the court.6 However,
the failure to challenge the absence of leave waives that defect and results
in the commencement of the third party action."'
Suppose that after a complaint has been filed and the jurisdiction ac-
quired over the person of the defendant, the complaint is stricken from
the files either because of a violation of Civil Rule 11,62 or because the
plaintiff has failed to comply with Civil Rule 12(E), s and leave to file a
new or amended complaint is not granted. What effect does this have on
commencement? Clearly Civil Rule 3(A) contemplates that the complaint
will remain on file as a pleading until the entry of final judgment. There-
fore, it is logical to conclude that if the complaint is stricken from the
files and not replaced by a new or amended complaint, the action fails of
commencement for want of a complaint. However, there does not seem to
be any reported decision on this point, and the question remains open.
On the other hand, if the original complaint is stricken from the files, but
with leave to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint will
most likely relate back to the filing of the original complaint.64 The action
will be deemed commenced as of the date the original complaint was
filed, and the striking of the original complaint will have no effect on
51 See OHIO R. Civ. P. 7(A), 14(A).
58 OHIO R. Civ. P. 14(A).
59 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
0 See Lombardo v. Calabrese, No. 44520 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 4,
1982)(Cuyahoga County).
See id. slip op. at 13-14.
In pertinent part, OHIo R. Cir. P. 11 states: "If a pleading is not signed or is signed
with intent to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and the
action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served." If it is the complaint that
is so stricken, no further proceedings in the action are required, and it is logical to conclude
that the action is at an end.
DHIO R. Civ. P. 12(E) provides:
If the motion [for a definite statement] is granted and the order of the court is not
obeyed within fourteen days after notice of the order or within such other time as
the court may fix, the court may strike the pleading to which the motion was
directed or make such other order as it deems just.
See Omo R. Civ. P. 15(C).
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commencement.
4. The Court
Civil Rule 3(A) is satisfied when the complaint is filed with "the court,"
but section 2305.17 requires the complaint to be filed with the "proper
court." Thus, the essential inquiry concerns the meaning of the word
"proper," and whether it is still a requisite to commencement. At the
minimum, the term "proper court" could mean either a court that is
proper as to venue or a court with subject matter jurisdiction of the ac-
tion, or both.
It is not likely, however, that "proper" refers to venue, at least not in
the context of the Civil Rules. Under the provisions of Rule 3(C)(1), the
remedy for improper venue is the transfer of the action to a proper venue.
Since a nonexistent action cannot be transferred, Civil Rule 3(C)(1) as-
sumes that commencement, and the presence or absence of venue, cannot
be a factor in commencement. The same would be true even in those rare
cases in which an action can be dismissed for faulty venue under the pro-
visions of Civil Rule 3(D). As pointed out in Kossuth v. Bear," only an
action that has been commenced can be dismissed; a nonexistent action
cannot be dismissed.6 Thus, once again, venue is not a factor; by speak-
ing of dismissal Civil Rule 3(D) assumes prior commencement.
If "proper court" means a court with subject matter jurisdiction, it
should be noted at the outset that commencement is not affected by the
filing of the complaint with the wrong division of the cotfrt if some other
division of the same court has subject matter jurisdiction; in this case, the
remedy is to transfer internally the action to the proper division. 7 But is
"proper" even related to subject matter jurisdiction? In Moyer v.
Moyer," the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County impliedly so held,
but on a motion for reconsideration, the opinion was withdrawn as con-
6' 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954).
' See supra note 1.
O7 See Mid-Ohio Chem. Liquid Fertilizers, Inc. v. Lowe, No. 80-CA-15 (Ohio 12th Dist.
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 1981)(Fayette County); Siebeuthal v. Summers, 56 Ohio App. 2d 168, 381
N.E.2d 1344 (10th Dist. 1978)(Franklin County); Yancey v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339
N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist. 1975)(Hamilton County).
68 No. 36991 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. July 6, 1978)(Cuyahoga County). The Moyer court
stated:
We conclude that the institution of proper proceedings is synonymous with
commencement of an action under Civ. R. 3(A) in a court with subject matter
jurisdiction. Civ. R. 3(A) provides: "A civil action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing." The
date of the filing of the complaint in a court of subject matter jurisdiction marks
the institution of proper proceedings if service is obtained within one year.
Id. slip op. at 6.
'9 Journal Entry, Moyer v. Moyer, No. 36991 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 12,
1978)(Cuyahoga County).
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flicting with the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in State ex rel. Balson v.
Harnishfeger.7 0 In the pre-Rule decision, Hoehn v. Empire Steel Co.,7'
the supreme court likewise so held in interpreting a statute analogous to
section 2305.17;72 but upon analysis, it appears that the supreme court
confused venue with subject matter jurisdiction. In any event, Hoehn was
expressly overruled in Wasyk v. Trent,73 in which the supreme court
clearly held that an action will be commenced even if the complaint is
filed in a court that lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the action be-
cause to hold otherwise would deprive the plaintiff of the remedial pro-
tection of section 2305.19, the "savings statute." 74 Thus, it appears that
subject matter jurisdiction is not a prerequisite to commencement, and
the term "proper" has no particular meaning. Accordingly, an action may
be commenced if the complaint is filed in any court. In any Ohio court,
that is, for the supreme court has said:
It is apparent that the word "court," as used in [Civil Rule] 3(A)
refers to an Ohio court, since Rule I(A) provides that the Ohio
Rules of Civil Procedure be limited to "courts of this state." Ac-
cordingly, the phrase "commenced or attempted to be com-
menced" contained in R.C. 2305.19 must be limited to actions
before the courts of this state, absent an express provision to the
contrary.
7
"
This raises the interesting problem of whether a federal court located
in Ohio is a "court of this state" for commencement purposes. In Wasyk
70 55 Ohio St. 2d 38, 377 N.E.2d 750 (1978).
71 172 Ohio St. 285, 175 N.E.2d 172 (1961).
72 Id. at 286-87, 175 N.E.2d at 173. The analogous statute in Hoehn was § 2703.01, which
was repealed effective July 1, 1971, as being in conflict with Civil Rule 3(A). Act of June 17,
1970, § 1, 1970 Ohio Laws 3017. Before its repeal, the statute read: "A civil action must be
commenced by filing in the office of the clerk of the proper court a petition and causing a
summons to be issued thereon." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2703.01 (Page 1964)(repealed
1971).
11 174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963).
1* Id. at 527-29, 191 N.E.2d at 60-61. The court noted:
Defendant contends that because of the lack of jurisdiction of the federal court,
the proceedings in that court were a nullity. Defendant makes this argument even
though he filed a motion to dismiss on the basis of lack of jurisdiction of the
federal court. Such motion required a hearing in that court, and it was not possi-
ble to know until that hearing that a jurisdictional requirement was lacking. Obvi-
ously, then, the federal court, although it lacked jurisdiction to determine the
merits of the cause, was possessed of jurisdiction to the extent that it could deter-
mine the question of diversity of citizenship.
It is, therefore, clear that the action was commenced, but likewise it is clear that
it was commenced in a court which had no jurisdiction of the subject matter of the
action.
Id. at 527, 191 N.E.2d at 60.
" Howard v. Allen, 30 Ohio St. 2d 130, 135, 283 N.E.2d 167, 170 (1972).
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v. Trent,7" the supreme court held that sections 2305.17 and 2305.19 ap-
plied to an action brought in the District Court for the Southern District
of Ohio, but the above-quoted language in a later decision casts doubt on
this holding. Perhaps the answer depends upon whether the federal ac-
tion is based on diversity of citizenship or whether it involves a federal
question. If it involves a federal question, the court will apply Rule 3 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 7 1 If the action is a diversity action,
the federal court will apply Ohio Rule 3(A), since there is a difference
between the federal and state rules, and that difference could be out-
come-determinative. 8 Thus, to the extent that the federal court would
apply Ohio law, it may be considered a "court of this state."
5. The Praecipe Demanding that Summons Issue
Section 2305.17 requires the filing of a praecipe demanding that sum-
mons issue; Civil Rule 3(A) does not. Is the conflict between the two such
that the statutory provision must be deemed impliedly repealed? Since
both the Rule and the statute address the same general subject, although
not the same precise point, it can be argued that the statutory require-
ment for a praecipe is not in conflict with the Rule but is, rather, a valid
supplement to the Rule which must be observed.7 9 However, the 1970
Rules Advisory Committee Staff Note to Civil Rule 3(A) implies that the
praecipe portion of section 2305.17 has been impliedly repealed by the
enactment of Rule 3(A),81 and the only case authority on point reached
the positive conclusion that the praecipe requirement has been repealed.$'
Although it was expressed in dicta, that conclusion seems sound, and un-
less the supreme court states otherwise, a plaintiff may dispense with the
filing of a praecipe demanding that summons issue.
6. The Affidavit for Service by Publication
The statute requires the filing of an affidavit for service by publication,
and the Rule does not. Here, however, the difference is without impor-
tance. Obviously, the statutory language applies only to those cases in
11 174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963).
77 FED R. Civ. P. 3 provides: "A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court."
18 See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980)(in a diversity action in
federal court, state statute providing that an action was not deemed commenced until ser-
vice of summons on defendant, rather than Federal Rule 3, applied to determine when an
action commenced for state statute of limitation purposes).
79 See Browne, supra note 31, at 393-94.
" See supra note 21.
"' Yancey v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 413-14, 339 N.E.2d 835, 837 (1st Dist.
1975) (Hamilton County). But see Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 67 n.4, 419 N.E.2d
1117, 1119 n.4 (8th Dist. 1979)(Cuyahoga County)(implying that filing of a praecipe was still
required after Rule 3(A) became effective).
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which service is sought to be made by publication. In such cases under
the Rules, Civil Rule 4.4(A) requires the same affidavit. Therefore, while
this aspect of the statute may not be in harmony with Rule 3(A), it is in
complete harmony with the Rules as a whole when Rules 3(A) and 4.4(A)
are read together.
B. Acquisition of Jurisdiction Within a Year
The Rule states that the action will be commenced "if service is ob-
tained within one year from filing""2 of the complaint while the statute
states "if service is obtained within one year."83 This slight difference in
language is completely without significance, since it is apparent that the
statute also means within one year from the filing of the complaint. It
should be noted, however, that neither the Rule nor the statute com-
pletely means what is says; both talk of service as an essential element of
commencement, but it is not; what both mean to say is that the action is
commenced if jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is obtained
within one year after the filing of the complaint.84 Service, of course, is
the normal manner in which such jurisdiction is acquired, and both the
Rule and the statute speak to the norm rather than to the exceptions. For
commencement purposes, it is immaterial how the court acquires in per-
sonata jurisdiction; what is material is that jurisdiction be acquired
within a year following the filing of the complaint.""
1. Effective Service
While the Rule and the statute speak only of "service," the courts have
made it clear that "service" means "effective service"; that is, the suffi-
cient service of a sufficient summons.8 ' If the defendant has not been
82 OHIo R. Civ. P. 3(A).
81 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.17 (Page 1981).
84 See Scigliano, supra note 5, at 275.
a' Id. As to the various methods of acquiring jurisdiction, see Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio
St. 3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984), where it is said:
It is rudimentary that in order to render a valid personal judgment, a court
must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant. This may be acquired either
by service of process upon the defendant, the voluntary appearance and submis-
sion of the defendant or his legal representative, or by certain acts of the defen-
dant or his legal representative which constitute an involuntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court. The latter may more accurately be referred to as a waiver
of certain affirmative defenses, including jurisdiction over the person under the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at 156, 464 N.E.2d at 540 (footnote omitted).
"O The supreme court in Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63, 362 N.E.2d 642 (1977), stated:
"Effective service of summons on the defendant is a necessary prerequisite to the com-
mencement of a civil action. Civ. R. 3(A)." To the same effect, see Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio
St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 222 (1966); Hoehn v. Empire Steel Co., 172 Ohio St. 285, 175 N.E.2d
172 (1961), rev'd on other grounds, Wasyk v. Trent, 174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963);
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served at all, and he does not otherwise submit his person to the jurisdic-
tion of the court, the action fails of commencement."7
"Sufficient service" means service made in accordance with the provi-
sions of Civil Rules 4 through 4.6. As a general rule, any method of ser-
vice will be sufficient service for commencement purposes if it is made in
accordance with the provisions of those Rules. In some cases, however,
either a Rule or a statute will restrict the method of service that may be
used in a given case or situation. Civil Rule 15(D), for example, permits
only personal service to be made on a "John Doe" defendant."' Thus, if a
"John Doe" defendant is served by any other method of service, the ser-
vice is insufficient, even though it is made in meticulous compliance with
the Rule governing it, and the action against "John Doe" will fail of com-
mencement.8 9 While the focus of inquiry in "sufficient service" situations
will generally be on compliance with the Rules governing service, compli-
ance is not necessarily the primary consideration. The plaintiff must se-
lect a method of service that is reasonably calculated, under all the cir-
cumstances, to give the defendant actual notice of the suit." If the
plaintiff deliberately chooses a method of service that is not likely to give
that actual notice, then the service is insufficient, even though there has
been religious compliance with the Rule governing that method of
service.91
Howard v. Allen, 28 Ohio App. 2d 275, 277 N.E.2d 239 (10th Dist. 1971)(Franklin County),
aff'd, 30 Ohio St. 2d 130, 289 N.E.2d 167 (1972); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pitstick, 7
Ohio Misc. 2d 53 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983).
87 See Maryhew v. Yova, I1 Ohio St. 3d 154, 159, 464 N.E.2d 538, 543 (1984); Kossuth v.
Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 384, 119 N.E.2d 285, 288 (1954).
" When the defendant's name is unknown, OHmO R. Civ. P. 16(D) provides: "The sum-
mons must contain the words 'name unknown,' and a copy thereof must be served person-
ally upon the defendant."
8" E.g., Uihlein v. Gladieux, 74 Ohio St. 232, 78 N.E. 363 (1906); Collins v. State, No.
82AP-370 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1983)(Franklin County); Lombardo v. Calabrese,
No. 44520 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 1982)(Cuyahoga County); Vocke v. City of Day-
ton, 36 Ohio App. 2d 139, 303 N.E.2d 892 (2d Dist. 1973)(Montgomery County); Tylee &
O'Rourke, Procedures for Filing of Actions Against Name-Unknown Defendants Under
Ohio Civil Rule 15(D), 58 LAW & FACT 3 (Apr. 1984).
For a similar situation involving Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2111.04(B)(1)(Page 1976), serv-
ing notice in guardianship proceedings, see In re Corless, 2 Ohio App. 3d 92, 440 N.E.2d
1203 (12th Dist, 1981)(Butler County).
" E.g., Akron-Canton Regional Airport Auth. v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St. 2d 403, 406
N.E.2d 811 (1980).
"' See Elliott v. Elliott, No. L-82-231 (Ohio 6th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1982)(Lucas
County); Ditwiler v. Hamilton, No. 81AP-267 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. July 30,
1981)(Franklin County); Goodwin v. Goodwin, No. CA 4954 (Ohio 5th Dist. Ct. App. Mar.
30, 1979)(Stark County). But see Kienzle v. Kienzle, No. 45035 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App.
Feb. 10, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), and J.R. Prods. v. Young, 3 Ohio App. 3d 407, 445 N.E.2d
740 (10th Dist. 1982)(Franklin County), in which the courts found the service to be valid
because the defendants did receive actual notice of the proceedings even though the plain-
tiff in Young had the summons sent to an address which he knew was not the defendant's
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Generally, a "sufficient summons" is a summons that contains all of
the information required by Civil Rule 4(B), or a publication that con-
tains all of the information required by Civil Rule 4.4(A). However, the
failure to include all of the requisite information in the summons or pub-
lication will not render them "insufficient" if the defendant has not been
prejudiced by the omission; 9 in this case, the omitted information may be
supplied by amendment. 3 But again, note must be taken of special re-
quirements imposed by Rule or statute. For example, Rule 15(D) requires
the summons in "John Doe" cases to contain the words "name un-
known."94 If this phrase is not included in the summons, the summons is
insufficient, and the court will not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant through the service of that summonsY5 As a general rule,
then, if the filing of the complaint is not followed by the sufficient service
of a sufficient summons, the action will fail of commencement. 6
2. The Defendant's Appearance in the Action
While the sufficient service of a sufficient summons is the normative
method of commencing a civil action, it is not the exclusive method; an
action may also be commenced if the defendant confers jurisdiction over
his person by entering an appearance in the action. 7 However, not every
appearance in the action by the defendant will result in the court's acqui-
sition of jurisdiction over his person; to accomplish this end, the appear-
ance must expressly or impliedly submit the defendant's person to the
court's jurisdiction. 9 This type of appearance can be found in the written
address and the plaintiff in Kienzle intercepted the summons in an effort to conceal the fact
of suit from the defendant.
The same result-invalid service and failure of commencement-may obtain even if the
plaintiff quite innocently selects a method of service not reasonably calculated to give actual
notice under all of the circumstances. See Black v. Barany, No. 44413 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct.
App. Sept. 30, 1983)(Cuyahoga County); Rinehart v. Taylor, No. 82AP-80 (Ohio 10th Dist.
Ct. App. June 29, 1982)(Franklin County); Grant v. Ivy, 69 Ohio App. 2d 40, 429 N.E.2d
1188 (10th Dist. 1980)(Franklin County).
,' Baldine v. Klee, 14 Ohio App. 2d 181, 237 N.E.2d 905 (7th Dist. 1968)(Trumbull
County).
"' OHIo R. Civ. P. 4.6(B).
01 See supra note 88.
0 Byers Enters. v. Factory Prods., No. 80AP-190 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Aug. 14,
1980)(Franklin County); Sidenstricker v. Weir, No. 78AP-160 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Aug.
17, 1978)(Franklin County); Browne, Ohio Civil Rule 8(C) and Related Rules; Some Notes
on the Pleading of Affirmative Defenses, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 329, 373 (1978); Tylee &
O'Rourke, supra note 89, at 3.
11 See cases cited supra note 86.
17 E.g., Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St. 3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984); Scigliano, supra
note 5, at 275.
"8 Scigliano, supra note 5, at 275. See also Browne, The Leave to Plead as a Waiver of
the Jurisdictional Defenses, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 431 (1984)(discussing when and how a
defendant's appearance waives jurisdictional defects under the Ohio Rules).
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waiver of service under the provisions of Civil Rule 4(D),19 the written
waiver of service in a promissory note,"'0 an express contractual provision
acknowledging that a particular court may exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant's person, 101 the settlement of a contested suit,102 the failure to
assert in a timely fashion the jurisdictional defenses by motion or an-
swer, e03 and perhaps, by the pleading of a counterclaim or cross-claim.1
0 4
An appearance by the defendant cannot be found if it does not unequivo-
cally submit the defendant's person to the court's jurisdiction, such as an
appearance for the purpose of obtaining an extension of time in which to
move or plead.'
3. Within a Year
In order to commence an action, the effective service or the appearance
must occur within the year immediately following the filing of the com-
plaint.' A "year" is twelve consecutive months and not 365 days; 01 thus,
if the complaint had been filed on March 1, 1983, the year would end on
March 1, 1984, and not on February 29, 1984, even though 1984 is a "leap
year.' 0 8 If a day can be gained because of a "leap year," so it can be lost;
if the complaint were filed on February 29, 1984, the year would end on
February 28, 1985.109 Since service of process is the usual method of ac-
quiring in personam jurisdiction and since service can take place at any
time of the day, the last day of the year extends to midnight of that day
and is not terminated at the anniversary hour of the filing of the com-
"I Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St. 3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984).
100 First Nat'l Bank of Dayton v. One Green St., Inc., No. 7293 (Ohio 2d Dist. Ct. App.
Nov. 25, 1981)(Montgomery County).
10I Alpha Indus. v. Tube Mach. Corp., 6 Ohio App. 3d 58, 453 N.E.2d 1114 (6th Dist.
1982)(Lucas County).
02 Ohio State Tie & Timber, Inc. v. Paris Lumber Co., 8 Ohio App. 3d 236, 456 N.E.2d
1309 (10th Dist. 1982)(Franklin County).
oI Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St. 3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984); Akron-Canton Regional
Airport Auth. v. Swinehart, 62 Ohio St. 2d 403, 406 N.E.2d 811 (1980); Security Ins. Co. v.
Transit Auth., 4 Ohio App. 3d 24, 446 N.E.2d 220 (8th Dist. 1982)(Cuyahoga County);
Franklin v. Franklin, 5 Ohio App. 3d 74, 449 N.E.2d 457 (7th Dist. 1981)(Mahoning
County); Hamilton v. East Ohio Gas Co., 47 Ohio App. 2d 55, 351 N.E.2d 775 (9th Dist.
1973)(Summit County); GMS Management Co. v. Axe,,5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Clev. Hts. Mun.
Ct. 1982).
"0' Kovacik v. Kovacik, No. 46117 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 13, 1983)(Cuyahoga
County); Annot. 17 A.L.R. FED. 388 (1973).
100 Maryhew, 11 Ohio St. 3d at 157-58, 464 N.E.2d at 541-42; Browne, supra note 98.
000 See cases cited supra note 13.
107 See Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Lowe, No. 81AP-437 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 20,
1981)(Franklin County); Schon v. National Tea Co., 19 Ohio App. 2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890
(7th Dist. 1969)(Mahoning County); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1.44(B) (Page 1984).
00' OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1.45 (Page 1984).
009 Id.
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plaint. 10 Thus, if the complaint was filed at 10 a.m. on March 1, 1983,
the year in which to acquire jurisdiction would expire at midnight on
March 1, 1984.
Again, since service can take place at any time, there is no logical rea-
son why the provisions of Civ. Rule 6(A) should apply to Rule 3(A)'s
"year";' but Rule 6(A) probably does apply, since it speaks in broad
general terms."' Therefore, if the last day of the year falls on a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday, the "year" does not end until midnight of the
next day which is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday."' However,
since service does not require access to the court, the last sentence of
Civil Rule 6(A)" does not apply and does not serve to extend automati-
cally the year in which to acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.
Can Civil Rule 3(A)'s "year" be extended under the provisions of Civil
Rule 6(B)? Rule 6(B) has two major parts; the first is a broad grant of
discretionary power which allows the trial judge to extend the "specified
time" in which "an act is required" to be done "by these rules," and the
second is a recitation of the Civil Rules to which this grant of power does
not apply." 5 Since Civil Rule 3(A) is not one of the Rules enumerated in
the second part, it is fair to conclude that it falls within the first part, and
- See State ex rel. Jones v. Board, 93 Ohio St. 14, 112 N.E. 136 (1915); Schon v. Na-
tional Tea Co., 19 Ohio App. 2d 222, 250 N.E.2d 890 (7th Dist. 1969)(Mahoning County).
al In pertinent part, OHIO R. Civ. P. 6(A) provides: "The last day of the period so com-
puted shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event
the period runs until the end of the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday." Scigliano, supra note 5, at 277-78, points out that the grace period provided by
Rule 6(A) because the clerk's office is closed is unnecessary in service of process which can
be effected at anytime.
I OHIO R. Clv. P. 6(A) begins: "In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed
by these rules .... "
113 Cf. Rahm v. Hemsoth, 53 Ohio App. 2d 147, 372 N.E.2d 358 (6th Dist. 1976)(Lucas
County)(when period in which plaintiff could bring cause of action ended on a Saturday, the
period is extended to next full work day).
... The last sentence of OHIo R. Civ. P. 6(A) reads:
When a public office in which an act, required by law, rule, or order of court, is to
be performed is closed to the public for the entire day which constitutes the last
day for doing such an act, or before its usual closing time on such day, then such
act may be performed on the next succeeding day which is not a Saturday, a Sun-
day, or a legal holiday.
"' OHIO R. Civ. P. 6(B) provides:
When by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act
is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the court for cause
shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order
the period enlarged if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period
originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order, or (2) upon motion made
after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the
failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time
for taking any action under Rule 50(B), Rule 59(B), Rule 59(D), and Rule 60(B),
except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.
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the court may, in its discretion, extend the period for acquiring jurisdic-
tion over the defendant beyond the one year stated in Rule 3(A). By its
terms, however, Civil Rule 6(B) does not apply to an act required by stat-
ute to be done within a specified time. Therefore, Rule 6(B), which seems
to permit an extension under Rule 3(A), would not permit the extension
of the one year time period found in section 2305.17, and we are again
faced with the question whether the Rule or the statute prevails. When
Rule 3(A) is read in the context of Rule 6(B), Rule 3(A)'s reference to
service within a year following the filing of the complaint becomes per-
missive/general. Section 2305.17, on the other hand, remains mandatory/
exclusive, since there is no statutory provision or Rules' provision author-
izing an extension of the one year period for service which it prescribes.
Although there is very little authority on point, it would appear that a
mandatory/exclusive statutory provision will prevail over a permissive/
general Rules' provision."' Therefore, until the supreme court holds oth-
erwise, it is more prudent to assume that the one year period for acquir-
ing jurisdiction over the defendant cannot be extended.
Whatever its merits in the abstract, this conclusion is consistent with
the principle underlying both section 2305.17 and Civil Rule 3(A). "The
service within one year requirement is retained from [section] 2305.17,
R.C., as amended in 1965, and is based on the philosophy that dockets
should be cleared if, within the reasonable time of one year, service has
not been obtained."'1 7 Extending the time for obtaining jurisdiction
would not achieve this goal of clearing the docket.
Can Civil Rule 3(A)'s "year" be reduced? Prior to the enactment of
Civil Rule 4(E), it was well settled that it could not be; the plaintiff had
an absolute right to a full year in which to acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant." 8 Civil Rule 4(E) now provides:
"I Cf. City of Akron v. Gay, 47 Ohio St. 2d 164, 351 N.E.2d 475 (1976)(court character-
ized statutory requirement in an appropriation proceeding that owner file an answer by a
particular date as "jurisdictional" and therefore unmodified by the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure). See also Browne, supra note 31, at 395-96.
The problem was discussed in Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 67 nn.3-4, 419
N.E.2d 1117, 1119 nn.3-4 (8th Dist. 1979)(Cuyahoga County), but was not resolved, because
appellants did not separately argue the overruling of their motion to extend the year in
which to obtain service.
... OIo R. Civ. P. 3(A) advisory committee note (1970). See also Maryhew v. Yova, 11
Ohio St. 3d 154, 157, 464 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1984)(referring to the "clearing the docket" ra-
tionale for the one year service requirement without attribution to the staff note).
Il See Twardowski v. Cooper, No. 8105 (Ohio 2d Dist. Ct. App. May 2, 1983)(Montgom-
ery County); Yancey v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist. 1975)(Hamil-
ton County); Hayden v. Ours, 44 Ohio Misc. 62 (C.P. Paulding County 1975).
However, if it became apparent that the court could never acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant, the complaint could be stricken from the files for failure of corn-
mencement before the year expired. Lozier v. Thorne, No. 5-78-34 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App.
May 25, 1979)(Hancock County).
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If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a
defendant within six months after the filing of the complaint and
the party on whose behalf such service was required cannot show
good cause why such service was not made within that period, the
action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice
upon the court's own initiative with notice to such party or upon
motion. This division shall not apply to out-of-state service pur-
suant to Rule 4.3 or to service in a foreign country pursuant to
Rule 4.5.
This new subdivision of Rule 4 has many problems," 9 not the least of
which is the meaning of the phrase "[ilf a service of summons and com-
plaint is not made upon a defendant within six months." This could be
read in either of two ways: 1) the plaintiff has not made any attempt to
serve the defendant within the first six months following the filing of the
complaint, or 2) there has been no effective service on the defendant
within six months after the filing of the complaint. In all probability, the
first reading is the intended reading since the Rule appears designed to
dispose of those cases in which the plaintiff files the complaint to stop
the running of the statute of limitations, and then requests the clerk to
withhold the issuance of the summons until the happening of some future
event.1 2) Thus, Rule 4(E) could be used to reduce the year in which to
obtain jurisdiction if the defendant was not served with a summons and
complaint within six months, but it would not apply if ineffective at-
tempts at service were made. Of course, since the principle underlying
Rule 4(E) is failure to prosecute, the Rule contemplates prompt and con-
tinuous efforts at obtaining effective service; if the plaintiff's first at-
tempt at service fails, and he thereafter makes no further attempt within
the six month period, he has failed to prosecute his action, and Rule 4(E)
should apply.
Rule 4(E) will not reduce the year if the plaintiff can show good cause
why he has not obtained service on the defendant; but what is "good
119 See Browne, supra note 5.
120 See, e.g., Twardowski v. Cooper, No. 8105 (Ohio 2d Dist. Ct. App. May 2, 1983)(Mont-
gomery County)(plaintiff's counsel failed to perfect service upon defendants although six
months had passed since filing of complaint); Scott v. Orlando, 2 Ohio App. 3d 333, 442
N.E.2d 96 (6th Dist. 1981)(Lucas County)(service was delayed at request of plaintiff's coun-
sel concerned with other ongoing litigation).
Filing the complaint and then requesting the clerk to withhold issuance of the summons is
a favorite tactic in "John Doe" situations, since the plaintiff frequently has no idea who
"John Doe" is and needs time to discover who he is, or whether or not he in fact exists. See,
e.g., Vocke v. City of Dayton, 36 Ohio App. 2d 139, 303 N.E.2d 892 (2d Dist. 1973)(Mont-
gomery County). This is a clear abuse of Civil Rule 15(D). See Collins v. State, No. 82AP-
370 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 6, 1983)(Franklin County); Jack Davis Painting Co. v.
Eller Enters., Inc., 8 Ohio App. 3d 211, 456 N.E.2d 1274 (10th Dist. 1982)(Franklin County).
Civil Rule 4(E) may serve to end this form of abuse.
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cause"? If the plaintiff could not reasonably be expected to know that he
had not obtained service on the defendant, Rule 4(E) should not apply.
Suppose, for example, that the plaintiff is suing both John and Jane
Smith. Through inadvertence, the clerk's office issues two summons for
John Smith and none for Jane. Both are sent by certified mail to the
Smith residence, and Jane Smith receives both. From the record, it would
appear that both John and Jane Smith had been served, but in fact, Jane
had not been served at all. This type of all-but-impossible-to-detect error
should constitute sufficient good cause to allow the plaintiff a full year in
which to obtain service on Jane Smith. On the other hand, not every error
by the clerk's office will amount to good cause, since the plaintiff has the
burden of ascertaining that effective service has been made;' 1 thus, the
test for good cause in conjunction with clerical error is whether the plain-
tiff could reasonably be expected to discover the lack of service. It is
hardly likely that the courts will find good cause if the plaintiff deliber-
ately asks that service be withheld because he does not know who the
defendant is 122 or because he does not want the defendant to know that
he has been sued.1 22
Is the "year" in which to obtain jurisdiction tolled by the provisions of
section 2305.15 of the Ohio Revised Code?"2 Although this question had
been discussed, 21 it has only recently been answered clearly. 21 In princi-
"' OHIo R. Civ. P. 4.6(E).
' See supra note 120 (withholding issuance of summons in "John Doe" suits).
"2 See Scott v. Orlando, 2 Ohio App. 3d 333, 442 N.E.2d 96 (6th Dist. 1981)(Lucas
County).
In pertinent part, Ouo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.15 (Page 1981), provides:
When a cause of action accrues against a person, if he is out of state, or has
absconded, or conceals himself, the period of limitation for the commencement of
the action . . . does not begin to run until he comes into the state or while he is so
absconded or concealed. After the cause of action accrues if he departs from the
state, or absconds or conceals himself, the time of his absence or concealment
shall not be computed as any part of a period within which the action must be
brought.
5 In Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 419 N.E.2d 1117 (8th Dist.
1979)(Cuyahoga County), the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County held that § 2305.15
tolled the statute of limitations while the defendant was absent from the state, but implied
that it would not toll the one year period in which to obtain jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant. Id. at 68-70, 419 N.E.2d at 1119-21. In Scott v. Orlando, 2 Ohio App. 3d 333,
442 N.E.2d 96 (6th Dist. 1981)(Lucas County), the Court of Appeals for Lucas County sug-
gested that § 2305.15 would toll the one year period in an appropriate case.
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in dismissing appellants' com-
plaint in that the time limit for service prescribed by R.C. 2305.17 and Civ. R.
3(A) might have been extended by applying the savings clause, R.C. 2305.15 to
those time limits. (Appellee had admitted to being absent from the state for ap-
proximately twenty-nine days.) We find this argument inapplicable given the facts
of this case.
Id. at 334, 442 N.E.2d at 97.
"' In the syllabus of Saunders v. Choi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984), the
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ple, this question should be answered in the negative, since section
2305.15 by its express terms applies only to "the period of limitation for
the commencement of the action" and the "period within which the ac-
tion must be brought."' 7 However, the year in which jurisdiction may be
acquired is not part of this period; it is completely independent. 2 ' There-
fore, by its own terms, section 2305.15 does not apply to either section
2305.17 or Civil Rule 3(A). Further, if section 2305.15 were to be applied
to Rule 3(A), it would render the Rule meaningless in most cases in which
service is attempted under the provisions of Civil Rules 4.3 or 4.5. Sup-
pose, for example, that the plaintiff filed suit against a nonresident defen-
dant who had never been physically present in Ohio, but who had con-
tracted to supply goods in Ohio. 1 9 If section 2305.15 were applicable to
either section 2305.17 or Civil Rule 3(A) under these circumstances, the
year in which to obtain jurisdiction over the person of the nonresident
defendant would not begin to run "until he comes into the state."' 30 Since
it is unlikely that the nonresident defendant would ever come into the
state, it then would follow that the year in which to get jurisdiction never
would begin to run. This would have the effect of completely nullifying
section 2305.17 and Civil Rule 3(A) in cases such as this, and it can
hardly be argued that such a result was contemplated by the supreme
court when it enacted Civil Rule 3(A). The approach to this question
adopted by the court in Saunders v. Choi,"' appears to be sound: if sec-
tion 2305.15 has tolled the statute of limitations because of the defen-
dant's absence from the state, but the plaintiff nevertheless brings suit,
the statute of limitations remains tolled, and the plaintiff has only a year
from the filing of the complaint in which to obtain jurisdiction over the
Ohio Supreme Court stated: "The tolling provisions of R.C. 2305.15 are expressly inapplica-
ble to an action brought under R.C. 2305.19, and cannot be used to extend the one-year
time limitation within which to commence an action under Civ. R. 3(A)." Id. at 247, 466
N.E.2d at 890 (syllabus).
," See supra note 124.
Although § 2305.17 is part of the chapter of the Revised Code relating to limitation of
actions, it is not a statute of limitation; its only purpose is to fix the date of the commence-
ment of an action within the terms of those statutes. Shaffer v. Shaffer, 69 Ohio App. 447,
452, 42 N.E.2d 176, 178 (2d Dist. 1941)(Montgomery County). The same is true with respect
to Civil Rule 3(A). It is not a statute of limitations, and it does not extend the applicable
period of limitations by a year. Samstag v. McDonough, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 354, 355 (8th Dist.
Ct. App. 1975)(Cuyahoga County). The dissent in Saunders v. Choi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466
N.E.2d 889 (1984), completely misses this point, and thus reaches an unacceptable result.
See id. at 251, 466 N.E.2d at 893 (C. Brown, J., dissenting).
129 OHIO R. Civ. P. 4.3(A)(2) allows out-of-state service. For the converse of this situation,
see Kleinfeld v. Link, 9 Ohio App. 3d 29, 457 N.E.2d 1187 (3d Dist. 1983)(Allen
County)(plaintiff in an action in Alaska court had obtained in personam jurisdiction over
the defendant, an Ohio resident, by use of a Alaska's "long arm" statute).
" See supra note 124 for the precise language of Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2305.15 (Page
1981).
13, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984).
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person of the defendant. If he does not obtain that jurisdiction within
that year, the action fails of commencement.'
32
Service by publication, as authorized by Civil Rule 4.4, can also present
certain problems. Suppose that the first of the required publications is
made within the year following the filing of the complaint, but the last is
not made until after that year has expired. Has the action been com-
menced? In Dolan v. Fulkert,133 the Court of Appeals for Lucas County
held that it was, but in Pistner u. Baxter,' the Court of Appeals for
Franklin County held that it was not, and the supreme court has yet to
resolve this conflict between the decisions. Of the two approaches, that of
Pistner is preferable, since it is based on a literal reading of the Civil
Rules,'3 " while the Dolan court tacitly admitted that it was taking liber-
ties with the language of the Rules.13 6 If the first publication is made
after the year has expired, the action clearly fails of commencement
under either the Dolan or Pistner approach."'
32 Id. at 250, 466 N.E.2d at 892.
13 30 Ohio App. 2d 165, 168, 284 N.E.2d 179, 182 (6th Dist. 1972)(Lucas County).
"a 2 Ohio App. 3d 69, 70, 440 N.E.2d 812, 813 (10th Dist. 1981)(Franklin County).
Id. In fact, Onjo R. Civ. P. 4.4(A) expressly states that "[s]ervice shall be complete at
the date of the last publication." OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(A)(1) provides: "[Ihf service of notice
has been made by publication, [the defendant] shall serve his answer within twenty-eight
days after the completion of service by publication"; i.e., within twenty-eight days after the
date of the last publication.
" The Dolan court said:
For more than one hundred years, under the statutory provision 2305.17 R.C.,
"the action is commenced at the date of the first publication,...." Even though
this section was amended in 1965 and the specific words referred to were elimi-
nated, it would appear that many competent practicing attorneys in the state of
Ohio would probably believe that the date of first publication is the date on which
service is considered to have been made. It is true that the new rules were adopted
and were to be construed so that just results could be obtained by eliminating
delay. However, they were not designed to entrap the unwary who had been "used
to doing it this way," for the last 10, 25, or 50 years. With particular emphasis on
the circumstances of this case and upon consideration of the relatively short time
the civil rules have been in effect, it is decided that the directive of Rule 1(B),
Construction, will not be violated by interpreting Rule 4.4(A) in such a way that
the words "service shall be complete at the date of the last publication" shall not
exclude the relating back of the last publication to the date of the first publica-
tion, if regularly made. In the absence of a clear mandatory requirement not to so
relate the last publication back, we hold that the date of the first publication is
the date service was obtained within Rule 3(A), even though not completed until
the last publication under Rule 4.4(A).
30 Ohio App. 2d at 170-71, 248 N.E.2d at 183.
" See Saunders v. Choi, No. 45101 (Ohio 8th Dist Ct. App. May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga
County), af/'d, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984); Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App.
2d 65, 419 N.E.2d 1117 (8th Dist. 1979)(Cuyahoga County).
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C. The Existence of the Parties
An action can only be commenced by a plaintiff that has real or legal
existence, and an action can be commenced only against a defendant who
has real or legal existence; thus, both the plaintiff and the defendant
must have real or legal existence at the time the complaint is filed. '38
This rule remains completely valid despite some loose language in recent
cases. What these recent cases have been discussing is not a change in the
rule of existence, but how and under what circumstances the action by or
against a nonexistent party can be deemed commenced against a substi-
tute for that party. 3 '
1. The Existence of the Defendant
There are three fundamental rules that govern commencement:
1. If the action is brought against an individual in his individual capac-
ity, he must be alive at the time the complaint is filed, and he must re-
main alive long enough for the court to acquire jurisdiction over his per-
son, or the action will fail of commencement against him.'
40
2. If the action is brought against an individual in his representative
capacity, he must be alive and have the legal authority to act as a repre-
"I See Barnhart v. Schultz, 53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds, Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983); State ex rel. Cleve-
land Mun. Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St. 2d 120, 296 N.E.2d 544 (1973);
Gentile v. Carr, 4 Ohio App. 3d 55, 446 N.E.2d 477 (7th Dist. 1981)(Jefferson County); Lev-
ering v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 2 Ohio App. 3d 157, 441 N.E.2d 290 (10th Dist.
1981)(Franklin County); Council of Whitehall v. Rogers, 69 Ohio App. 2d 124, 432 N.E.2d
217 (10th Dist. 1980)(Franklin County); Samstag v. McDonough, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 354 (8th
Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(Cuyahoga County); Group of Tenants v. Mar-Len Realty, Inc., 40 Ohio
App. 2d 449, 321 N.E.2d 241 (3d Dist. 1974)(Allen County); Vocke v. City of Dayton, 36
Ohio App. 2d 139, 303 N.E.2d 892 (2d Dist. 1973)(Montgomery County); GMS Management
Co. v. Axe, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1982).
Defendants, of course, must not only be in existence at the time the complaint is filed, but
they must remain in existence long enough for the court to obtain jurisdiction over their
person. If a defendant should cease to exist before service or the entry of a suitable appear-
ance, no action can be commenced against the defendant.
I'l See, e.g., Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983)(substitution of
administrator of deceased defendant's estate); Gentile v. Carr, 4 Ohio App. 3d 55, 446
N.E.2d 477 (7th Dist. 1981)(Jefferson County)(executrix of deceased defendant's estate
substituted).
"' Barnhart v. Schultz, 53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978), rev'd on other grounds,
Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983); Hobbs v. Kurek, No. 45432
(Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1983)(Cuyahoga County); Dewey v. Prater, No. L-81-169
(Ohio 6th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 8, 1981)(Lucas County); Gentile v. Carr, 4 Ohio App. 3d 55,
446 N.E.2d 477 (7th Dist. 1981)(Jefferson County); Rahm v, Hemsoth, No. L-79-006 (Ohio
6th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1979)(Lucas County); Little v. Little, No. 6197 (Ohio 2d Dist. Ct.
App. June 27, 1979)(Montgomery County); Samstag v. McDonough, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 354 (8th
Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(Cuyahoga County); Hayden v. Ours, 44 Ohio Misc. 62 (C.P. Paulding
County 1975).
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sentative at the time the complaint is filed. He must remain alive and
retain his legal authority to act as a representative long enough for the
court to acquire jurisdiction over his person as a representative, or the
action will fail of commencement against him as such representative. 4 '
3. If the action is brought against an entity, that entity must have legal
existence at the time the complaint is filed, and it must remain in legal
existence long enough for the court to acquire jurisdiction over it, or the
action will fail of commencement against it as an entity.
4 2
Note carefully, however, that these rules only require the conclusion
that the action has not been commenced against the named defendant;
they do not necessarily require the conclusion that the action cannot be
commenced against someone other than the named defendant or that a
new action cannot be commenced against someone other than the defen-
dant named in the original action. Suppose, for example, that an individ-
ual defendant is dead at the time the complaint is filed. If the defen-
dant's death is discovered before the statute of limitations has run on the
claim, a new action can be commenced against the estate of the deceased
defendant at any time before that statute expires.' Indeed, under these
circumstances, the new action might be brought directly against the de-
ceased defendant's liability insurance carrier. 44
This particular road to recovery is dependent upon the statute of limi-
tations. Thus, it is essential that every plaintiff should be careful to avoid
the problem identified by the Ohio Supreme Court in Barnhart v. Sch-
ultz."" The plaintiff should either discover the status of the defendant
before filing the complaint, or he should file the complaint far enough in
advance of the expiration of the statute of limitations to allow time to
bring a second action against an appropriate defendant after discovery of
the death or nonexistence of the original defendant.
There are times, of course, when circumstances make the early filing of
the complaint impossible. If that is the case, and if the plaintiff suspects
I" See Wrinkle v. Trabert, 174 Ohio St. 233, 188 N.E.2d 587 (1963); Little v. Little, No.
6197 (Ohio 2d Dist. Ct, App. June 27, 1979)(Montgomery County); Nissen v. Callahan, No.
38132 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1979)(Cuyahoga County).
" See Catchings v. Cleveland Pub. Schools, No. 43730 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 1,
1982)(Cuyahoga County); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Colerain Township Trustees, No. C-800050
(Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1981)(Hamilton County).
... This conclusion is subject, of course, to the provisions of Chapter 2117 of the Ohio
Revised Code. See, e.g., In re Estate of George, 24 Ohio St. 2d 18, 262 N.E.2d 872 (1970);
Meinberg v. Glaser, 14 Ohio St. 2d 193, 237 N.E.2d 605 (1968); Banas & Cornett, Legal
Malpractice: New Rules in Ohio, 57 OHio ST. B.A. REp. 36, 38 (1984).
'" See Heuser v. Crum, 31 Ohio St. 2d 90, 285 N.E.2d 340 (1972).
53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978). As the supreme court put it: "[T]he plain-
tiffs have attempted timely filing but have failed either to discover that the original defen-
dant has died or to insure themselves against such a discovery by filing their complaint
sufficiently in advance of the statutory deadline." Id. at 62, 372 N.E.2d at 591-92.
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the defendant may be dead but cannot determine whether that is so,'"
the plaintiff should join the defendant's liability insurance carrier as a
party-defendant in the suit against the insured defendant. The claim
against the insurance company would be stated hypothetically, 147 condi-
tioned on the contingency that the defendant is deceased, and it would be
made as an alternative to the claim against the defendant.'4 8 If it thereaf-
ter turns out that the defendant was deceased at the time that the com-
plaint was filed, this method of pleading will commence an action against
the defendant's liability insurance carrier which is deemed the real party
in interest to the extent that the conditions of the last paragraph of sec-
tion 2117.07 pertaining to presentation of claims against an estate are sat-
isfied." ' On the other hand, if the defendant is alive and if jurisdiction is
obtained over his person, the claim against the insurance carrier will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.'5 0
In either case, the plaintiff has commenced the action against a defen-
dant who must then respond in damages if the plaintiff is successful in
proving his case.
If the statute of limitations has run before the plaintiff discovers the
death of the defendant, the plaintiffs position is difficult, but not impos-
sible; much depends upon how much time there is left in the year follow-
ing the filing of the complaint. If that year expires before corrective mea-
sures are taken, the action will not have been commenced against the
named defendant who is dead, and the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions will prevent its commencement against the decedent's estate or lia-
bility carrier.
If the plaintiff is lucky, at sometime during the year following the filing
"I' The local public library may be of assistance in ascertaining whether the defendant is
alive or dead. Many libraries keep copies of the obituaries published in the local papers. A
search of this reference file might reveal an obituary for the defendant, and the search itself
would not take a great deal of time. Indeed, a well-staffed library will perform the search for
you if you place a call to the reference department.
147 See OHIO R. Civ. P. 8(E)(2).
48 Id. For the allegations which are essential to such a claim against the liability insur-
ance carrier, see the cases cited supra note 143.
' Heuser v. Crum, 31 Ohio St. 2d 90, 285 N.E.2d 340 (1972). As the court noted:
By operation of law, the decedent's liability insurer is now the sole entity that
can be required to respond in possible damages to the [plaintiff's] allegations. As
such, it is the only defendant below which has any interest in the outcome of this
litigation. It arrives at this position by virtue of the contract it made with the
decedent and the consideration which supports that contract. The presence of a
legal representative of the estate under these facts has become perfunctory; a
methodical posture which is maintained out of a desire to obviate any possibility
that the existence of an insurer as a party defendant could influence the verdict of
the jury.
Id. at 93-94, 285 N.E.2d at 342-43.
'10 Chitlik v. Allstate Ins. Co., 34 Ohio App. 2d 193, 299 N.E.2d 295 (8th Dist.
1973)(Cuyahoga County).
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of the complaint, the deceased defendant's personal representative will
accept service of summons, voluntarily enter an appearance in the action,
and request that he be substituted for the named defendant. In this case,
the action will be deemed commenced against the estate of the deceased
defendant, and the summons and complaint can be amended to reflect
service on the personal representative and a claim against the estate of
the deceased defendant.' If the plaintiff is unlucky, the personal repre-
sentative will make no response to the attempted service on the deceased
defendant,' 5 2 or the estate will be closed and the personal representative
discharged at the time service on the deceased defendant is attempted.
Should this be the case, the plaintiff must discover the death of the de-
fendant and must take corrective measures before the year for acquiring
jurisdiction expires.
If the estate is still open at the time the plaintiff learns of the defen-
dant's death, the plaintiff should move for leave immediately, under the
provisions of Civil Rules 15(C) and 21, to amend the complaint and sub-
stitute the deceased's personal representative for the originally named de-
fendant. As part of the motion for leave to amend, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the requirements of Civil Rule 15(C)(1) and 15(C)(2)
have been met: 1) before the statute of limitations expired, the personal
representative of the deceased had received such notice of the institution
of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on
the merits, and 2) before the statute of limitations expired, the personal
representative knew or should have known that, but for a mistake con-
cerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been
brought against him.153 If the claim is covered by the deceased defen-
dant's liability insurance, this notice and knowledge requirement can be
satisfied by showing that the insurance carrier had timely notice of the
claim prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.'54
If the court is satisfied that the provisions of Rule 15(C) have been
met, it should grant leave to amend. The plaintiff must then promptly
file a copy of the amended complaint naming the personal representative
as the defendant and serve the amended complaint and a summons on
the personal representative within the year following the filing of the
"' Gentile v. Carr, 4 Ohio App. 3d 55, 446 N.E.2d 477 (7th Dist. 1981)(Jefferson County).
Although Gentile does not mention amendment of the summons, OHIo R. Civ. P. 4.6(B)
authorizes such an amendment, and it would seem appropriate to amend the summons to
reflect service on the personal representative of the deceased defendant.
,'6 Since the deceased defendant obviously has not been served, he is not a "party" to the
proceedings at this point, and OHIO R. Civ. P. 25 does not apply. Therefore, the personal
representative need not serve and file the suggestion of death required by OHIO R. Civ. P.
25(E).
"'. Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 128-29, 447 N.E.2d 104, 107 (1983).
'5 Id.
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original complaint.'51 If effective service is made on the personal repre-
sentative within that year, the amended complaint will relate back to the
date on which the original complaint was filed, and the action against the
personal representative will be deemed commenced as of that date.
156
However, if effective service on the personal representative is not ob-
tained within a year following the filing of the original complaint, and if
the personal representative makes no jurisdiction-granting appearance
within that year, the action fails of commencement, and the original com-
plaint should be stricken from the files."1 7 Likewise, if the court is not
satisfied that the provisions of Civil Rule 15(C) have been met, it should
overrule the plaintiff's motion for leave to amend and strike the original
complaint from the files, since the original action has not been com-
menced against anyone.
1 5 8
If the estate of the deceased defendant is closed at the time the defen-
dant's death is discovered, or if there has been no administration of the
estate, the plaintiff must first have the estate reopened or an administra-
tor appointed 5 ' and must then move for leave to amend to follow the
procedure outlined above. The difficulty here will be that of demonstrat-
ing compliance with the notice and knowledge requirements of Civil Rule
15(C)(1) and 15(C)(2). In the absence of an involved liability insurance
carrier, that may well be impossible,'8 and if it does prove to be impossi-
ble, the amendment cannot be allowed, and the action will fail of
Id. at 129, 447 N.E.2d at 108.
Id. See OHIo R. Civ. P. 15(C). The amended complaint will relate back because the
claim stated against the personal representative will have arisen "out of the conduct, trans-
action, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original [complaint]." Id.
Thus, the date of commencement will be the date on which the original complaint was filed.
157 Baker, 4 Ohio St. 3d at 129, 447 N.E.2d at 108; Neville v. Restivo, No. 3283 (Ohio 11th
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 30, 1984)(Trumbull County). Although a number of courts have said
that the action should be "dismissed" under these circumstances, it is clear that the correct
disposition of the action is to strike the complaint from the files for failure of commence-
ment, since a nonexistent action cannot be dismissed. See Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St.
378, 383-84, 119 N.E.2d 285, 288 (1954); Saunders v. Choi, No. 45101 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct.
App. May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), affd, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984).
158 See Baker, 4 Ohio St. 3d at 129, 447 N.E.2d at 108. Civil Rule 3(A) does not extend by
one year the time for giving the notice required by Rule 15(C)(1). See Williams v. Jerry L.
Kaltenbach Enters., Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d 113, 114 n.1, 440 N.E.2d 1219, 1221 n.1 (1st Dist.
1981)(Hamilton County)(citing with approval Kirtley v. Pennington, No. C-780425 (Ohio 1st
Dist. Ct. App. July 11, 1979)(Hamilton County)). For the proposition that a court may
strike the original complaint from the files on its own initiative when the requirements of
Rule 15(C) have not been met, see Saunders v. Choi, No. 45101 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App.
May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), aff'd, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984), and Na-
tionwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pitstick, 7 Ohio Misc. 2d 53 (C.P. Hamilton County 1983).
"I See Hobbs v. Kurek, No 45432 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 1983)(Cuyahoga
County); Hayden v. Ours, 44 Ohio Misc. 62 (C.P. Paulding County 1975).
140 See Kent, Substituting the Administrator or Executor, 54 CLEV. B.J. 242, 242-43
(1983).
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commencement.16 '
If the deceased defendant has liability insurance, the supreme court's
rationale in Heuser v. Crum' may provide an alternative to the proce-
dure outlined above. If the defendant has sufficient liability insurance
such that no portion of the plaintiff's recovery shall come from the assets
of the estate, and if that liability insurance has not itself become an asset
of the estate because of a previous claim made against the defendant or
his estate,'6 3 then the plaintiff can move for leave to amend and substi-
tute the liability carrier for the original defendant. The insurer then can
be effectively served with the amended complaint and a summons within
the year following the filing of the original complaint. If the plaintiff had
been negotiating with the liability carrier before the expiration of the
statute of limitations (as is quite likely to be the case), such negotiations
will obviate the notice and knowledge requirements of Civil Rule 15(C)(1)
and 15(C)(2)."" While this method has not been tested in litigation, it is
certainly worth an attempt in those cases where the plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that the deceased defendant's personal representative had
the notice and knowledge required by Civil Rule 15(C).'
If the death of the defendant is discovered too late in the one year
post-filing period to allow for effective service on the defendant's per-
sonal representative or liability insurance carrier, the plaintiff might just
as well gamble on the riskiest remedy of all. This consists of a Civil Rule
41(A)(2) court-ordered voluntary dismissal of the action against the de-
ceased defendant and the filing of a new action against the defendant's
'6' Williams v. Jerry L. Kaltenbach Enters., Inc., 2 Ohio App. 3d 113, 440 N.E.2d 1219
(1st Dist. 1981)(Hamilton County); Samstag v. McDonough, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 354 (8th Dist.
Ct. App. 1975)(Cuyahoga County).
Rahm v. Hemsoth, No. L-79-006 (Ohio 6th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 1979)(Lucas County),
suggests that the personal representative of the deceased might be substituted under the
provisions of Civil Rule 25(A) if the time limits of Rule 25 are met. However, as pointed out
in supra note 152, Civil Rule 25 does not apply to this situation because the originally
named defendant is not a "party" to the action.
162 31 Ohio St. 2d 90, 285 N.E.2d 340 (1972). The Heuser court's rationale is quoted in
supra note 149.
The facts in Heuser are, of course, distinguishable from the situation discussed in the
text, since in Heuser the liability carrier was named as a co-defendant in the original com-
plaint, and thus the action was clearly commenced against the carrier. However, if the su-
preme court will adhere to the position it took in Heuser-that the insurer of a deceased
defendant is the sole entity that can be required to respond in damages to the plaintiff's
allegations-the difference between the facts in the case and the text will be insignificant,
and there should be no reason why the insurer discussed in the text could not be substituted
for the insured under the provisions of Civil Rules 15(C) and 21.
1"I See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2117.07 (Page 1981), and the cases cited supra notes 143,
162.
" See Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983); Kent, supra note
160.
16 For a case in which the plaintiff could not make the necessary demonstration, see
Samstag v. McDonough, 75 Ohio Op. 2d 354 (8th Dist. Ct. App. 1975)(Cuyahoga County).
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personal representative under the provisions of section 2305.19. Since the
"nullity" theory has been abandoned, it can be argued plausibly that the
action against the deceased defendant was "an action attempted to be
commenced." 6 Further, a Rule 41(A)(2) voluntary dismissal of that ac-
tion by court order is a "failure" of that action other than on the mer-
its. 16 7 Therefore, the action against the deceased defendant was an action
attempted to be commenced which failed other than on the merits after
the statute of limitations had expired, and under the provisions of section
2305.19, the plaintiff has a year from the date of dismissal in which to file
a new action against the deceased defendant's personal representative.""
The risk involved in this remedy is that section 2305.19 does not apply
when the parties and the relief sought in the new action are different
from those in the original action. 65 Obviously, the relief sought in both
actions is the same, but the problem arises out of the requirement that
the parties be the same. Will the personal representative of the deceased
defendant be deemed the same party as the deceased defendant? The
question is an open one, but in Baker v. McKnight1 70 the Ohio Supreme
Court cited with approval the following passage from Eberbach v.
McNabney:17 1 "Though Castor [the named defendant] is dead, his legal
existence is not extinguished, but shifted to the special administrator of
his estate in existence at the date of the original complaint. The special
administrator stands in the shoes of the decedent in defending against
liability for his alleged torts."' 72 The court also quoted the unreported
appellate opinion in Barnhart v. Schultz' 7' to the effect that "[tihe even-
tual substitution of the fiduciary of the alleged tortfeasor's estate was not
a new cause of action and did not involve an entire change in any of the
parties. 1 74 Based on these two passages, an argument may be made that
the deceased defendant and his personal representative are one and the
same party for purposes of section 2305.19; whether this argument will be
"I See infra section IV. B.
167 See Chadwick v. Barba Lou, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 222, 431 N.E.2d 660 (1982). A volun-
tary dismissal by notice may have the same effect. See Harris v. Sheedy Paving, Inc., No.
82AP-965 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 1983)(Franklin County).
"I6 In pertinent part, OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1981), states: "In an action
commenced, or attempted to be commenced, . . . if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon
the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action at the date of...
failure has expired, the plaintiff... may commence a new action within one year after such
date."
"I6 Children's Hosp. v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 69 Ohio St. 2d 523, 433 N.E.2d 187
(1982).
170 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983).
178 413 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
'7 Baker, 4 Ohio St. 3d at 128, 447 N.E.2d at 107 (footnote omitted)(quoting Eberbach v.
McNabney, 413 NE.2d 958, 962 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980)).
No. C-75377 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1977)(Hamilton County).
Baker, 4 Ohio St. 3d at 128 n.3, 447 N.E.2d at 107 n.3 (quoting Barnhart v. Schultz,
No. C-75377, slip op. at 4 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 1977)(Hamilton County)).
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successful remains to be seen.
Turn now to the problem posed by individuals being sued in their rep-
resentative capacity and postulate that the complaint must be filed im-
mediately because the statute of limitations is about to run. Suppose that
the plaintiff knows that the alleged tortfeasor is dead and has reason to
believe that his estate is in administration, but does not know the iden-
tity of the tortfeasor's personal representative. May the plaintiff file the
complaint against "John Doe, real name unknown, administrator or exec-
utor of the estate of John L. Pressly, deceased"?
If a personal representative has in fact been appointed as administrator
or executor at the time the complaint was filed, and was alive at that
time, the answer appears to be in the affirmative. This is a straight for-
ward Civil Rule 15(D) case, and if the plaintiff follows the requirements
of that Rule, the action will be commenced against the personal represen-
tative of the deceased tortfeasor.
But what if the personal representative has not been appointed as such
at the time the complaint was filed? Clearly, no action has been com-
menced against him since he has no legal existence,'17 and not even a
"John Doe" action can be commenced against a nonexistent defendant.'
After his appointment as administrator or executor, can he be substituted
for "John Doe" by an amendment made under the provisions of Civil
Rules 15(C) and 21, assuming the notice and knowledge requirements of
Rule 15(C) can be satisfied? In Nissen v. Callahan,"' the Court of Ap-
peals for Cuyahoga County held that he could not; however, this holding
was based on the "nullity" theory of Barnhart v. Schultz.'78 Since that
theory was overruled in Baker v. McKnight'17 9 it would seem that substi-
tution by amendment would now be in order, the amendment relating
back to the date the original complaint was filed so that the date of com-
mencement would be the date of the original filing."0'
The case of the entity that has no legal existence poses a more difficult
problem simply because there may not be any person or entity that can
'16 Nissen v. Callahan, No. 38132 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1979)(Cuyahoga
County).
178 Vocke v. City of Dayton, 36 Ohio App. 2d 139, 303 N.E.2d 892 (2d Dist. 1973)(Mont-
gomery County).
'" No. 38132 (Ohio Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1979)(Cuyahoga County).
", 53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978). The court expressed the "nullity" theory as
follows:
It is accepted law that an action may only be brought against a party who actu-
ally or legally exists and has the capacity to be sued .... Because a party must
actually or legally exist, "one deceased cannot be a party to an action" .. and a
suit brought against a dead person is a nullity ....
Id. at 61, 372 N.E.2d at 591.
'7' 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983).
Although not directly on point, Hobbs v. Kurek, No. 45432 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App.
Apr. 28, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), tends to support this conclusion.
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be substituted for the named defendant. If there is no available substi-
tute, the action against such an entity simply fails of commencement."' If
there is an available substitute, the action will be commenced as of the
date the original complaint was filed if the person or entity can be substi-
tuted under the provisions of Civil Rules 15(C) and 21; otherwise it too
will fail of commencement.'82
2. The Existence of the Plaintiff
Here, too, there are three fundamental rules that govern
commencement:
1. If the action is brought by an individual in his individual capacity,
he must be alive at the time the complaint is filed, or the action will fail
of commencement as to him.'83
2. If the action is brought by an individual in his representative ca-
pacity, he must be alive and have the legal authority to act as a represen-
tative at the time the complaint is filed, or the action will fail of com-
mencement as to him as representative. 18
4
3. If the action is brought by an entity, that entity must have legal
existence at the time the complaint is filed, or the action will fail of com-
mencement as to the entity.'85
Again, of course, the application of these rules leads only to the conclu-
sion that the action cannot be commenced by the nonexistent named
plaintiff; application does not mandate the conclusion that the action
cannot be commenced by someone other than the named plaintiff or that
a new action cannot be commenced by some other party. If the statute of
limitations has not expired, for example, a new action can be commenced
by the personal representative of the named plaintiff who was deceased
at the time the original complaint was filed.
If the statute of limitations has expired before the nonexistence of the
named plaintiff is discovered, may some appropriate person be substi-
tuted for the named plaintiff and thus commence the original action? A
"' Safeco Ins. Co. v. Colerain Township Trustees, No. C-800050 (Ohio 1st Dist. Ct. App.
Mar. 4, 1981)(Hamilton County).
,82 Catchings v. Cleveland Pub. Schools, No. 43730 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 1,
1982)(Cuyahoga County).
113 See Levering v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 2 Ohio App. 3d 157, 441 N.E.2d 290 (10th
Dist. 1981)(Franklin County).
'81 Douglas v. Daniels Bros. Coal Co., 135 Ohio St. 641, 22 N.E.2d 195 (1939).
'85 State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v. Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St. 2d 120, 296
N.E.2d 544 (1973); Lock Bros. Excavating Co. v. Dye, No. 3039 (Ohio l1th Dist. Ct. App.
Mar. 1, 1982)(Trumbull County); SES, Inc. v. Scott, No. WD-81-44 (Ohio 6th Dist. Ct. App.
Dec. 11, 1981)(Wood County); Council of Whitehall v. Rogers, 69 Ohio App. 2d 124, 432
N.E.2d 216 (10th Dist. 1980) (Franklin County); Group of Tenants v. Mar-Len Realty, Inc.
40 Ohio App. 2d 449, 321 N.E.2d 241 (3d Dist. 1974)(Allen County); GMS Management Co.
v. Axe, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1982).
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number of the cases that have considered this point have held that the
substitution cannot take place.'86 For the most part, however, these cases
were decided after Barnhart v. Schultz 18 7 and before Baker v. Mc-
Knight,'"8 and the decision in each was premised on the "nullity" theory
espoused by Barnhart.' Since that theory was repudiated by Baker, the
question is again open.
Baker v. McKnight is authority for the conclusion that substitution
may now take place if the cause of action survives the death or nonexis-
tence of the named plaintiff. The question to be decided is: What Civil
Rule governs the substitution? It is reasonably clear that Civil Rule 25
does not furnish the authority for substitution under these circumstances
since, by its terms, it applies to the death of a "party" to the action, and
a nonexistent plaintiff cannot be a party.190 Some courts have held or
implied that the substitution is governed by the provisions of Civil Rule
15(C).' 9' That is only partially correct. The first sentence of Rule 15(C),
dealing with the relation back of the claim set forth in the amended com-
plaint, most assuredly applies and must be satisfied if substitution is to
occur,' 2 but the balance of the Rule dealing with the bringing in of new
parties applies to new party defendants only and has no application to
the substitution of a new party plaintiff. Rather, in this situation, the
controlling Rule is Rule 17(A), which in pertinent part provides:
Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party
in interest . . . . No action shall be dismissed on the ground that
it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until
a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification
See, e.g., Excavating Co. v. Dye, No. 3039 (Ohio 11th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 1,
1982)(Trumbull County)(when action is knowingly brought in name of nonexistent corpora-
tion, no substitution of individual plaintiffs is allowed); SES, Inc. v. Scott, No. WD-81-44
(Ohio 6th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1981)(Wood County)(business which was not incorporated
in Ohio lacked capacity to sue or to amend its complaint to substitute another party); Lev-
ering v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 2 Ohio App. 3d 157, 441 N.E.2d 290 (10th Dist.
1981)(Franklin County)(refusing to allow substitution of party succeeding to decedent's
claim); Council of Whitehall v. Rogers, 69 Ohio App. 2d 124, 432 N.E.2d 216 (10tb Dist.
1980)(Franklin County)(barring substitution of a real party in interest when purported
plaintiff was not a person entitled to maintain action).
987 53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978).
'a 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983).
' See supra note 178.
990 Levering v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 2 Ohio App. 3d 157, 159, 441 N.E.2d 290, 292
(10th Dist. 1981)(Franklin County).
"' See, e.g., Gates Towing v. Branch Motor Express, 1 Ohio App. 3d 149, 440 N.E.2d 61
(10th Dist. 1981)(Franklin County); Deansgate, Inc. v. Frederick, No. 37428 (Ohio 8th Dist.
Ct. App. July 20, 1978)(Cuyahoga County); Bell v. Coen, 48 Ohio App. 2d 325, 357 N.E.2d
392 (9th Dist. 1975)(Summit County).
' See, e.g., Douglas v. Daniels Bros. Coal Co., 135 Ohio St. 641, 22 N.E.2d 195 (1939) (al-
lowing amendment and relation back when party mistakenly brought wrongful death action
as administrator but had not yet been appointed).
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of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of,
the real party in interest. Such ratification, joinder, or substitu-
tion shall have the same effect as if the action had been com-
menced in the name of the real party in interest.
Since a nonexistent plaintiff cannot be a "party," it necessarily follows
that a nonexistent plaintiff cannot be a real party in interest. Thus, if the
action survives at all, it must survive to someone who is a real party in
interest. Such a "successor in interest" may ratify the attempted com-
mencement"9 3 of the action by the original plaintiff, or can be joined with
an existing co-plaintiff, or can be substituted for the nonexistent plaintiff.
As the last sentence of Rule 17(A) indicates, this cure by ratification,
joinder, or substitution effectively relates back to the filing of the original
complaint so that the action will be deemed commenced by the "succes-
sor in interest" as of the date of the filing of the original complaint. Of
course, if the action does not survive the nonexistence of the original
plaintiff or if there is no successor in interest, there can be no cure, and
the action must be disposed of by striking the complaint from the files for
failure of commencement. The same would be true if the cure was not
effected within a reasonable time after the nonexistence of the plaintiff
was discovered.
1 94
In an appropriate case, then, the nonexistence of the plaintiff can be
cured by ratification, joinder, or substitution. However, the mechanics of
effecting the cure can present some subtle problems. To begin with, let us
suppose the action is brought by a person in his individual capacity, but
who is dead at the time the complaint is filed. If the action survives his
death, his successor in interest is his estate as represented by his personal
representative, executor or administrator. As there is no existing plaintiff,
ratification is an inappropriate method of cure since that requires some-
one in existence whose acts may be ratified by the deceased's personal
representative. Likewise, since there is no existing co-plaintiff, joinder is
inappropriate for it requires someone with whom the personal representa-
tive can be joined as a co-plaintiff. Thus as a practical matter, substitu-
tion is the only appropriate measure.
How substitution is to be effectuated may well depend upon who first
"1 It is unfortunate that OHIO R. Civ. P. 17(A) was copied from FED. R. Civ. P. 17(A)
without taking into consideration the peculiar problem of commencement under OHIO R.
Ci. P. 3(A). Thus, OHIo R. Civ. P. 17(A) states that a reasonable time must be allowed for
"ratification of commencement of the action" when it should read "for ratification of the
attempted commencement of the action." See infra section IV. B.
,94 Omio R. Civ. P. 17(A) states that the action must be "dismissed" if the cure is not
effected within a reasonable time. That assumes that the action was commenced by an ex-
isting plaintiff who was not a real party in interest. Where the action was attempted to be
commenced by a nonexistent plaintiff, and the cure for that nonexistence is not effected
within a reasonable time, the proper disposition of the action is the striking of the com-
plaint from the files for failure of commencement. See supra note 157.
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discovers the death of the named plaintiff. If the defendant discovers the
death of the named plaintiff and challenges commencement on that
ground,'9" the defendant's challenge, in whatever form it may be
presented, should be taken as a motion to have the personal representa-
tive substituted for the deceased. Pursuant to that challenge, the court
should grant leave to file an amended complaint substituting the personal
representative for the named plaintiff. Since Rule 17(A) is controlling
here and since it is specific in this instance, it should prevail over Civil
Rule 21, and leave to amend under the latter Rule is not required. Once
leave under Rule 17(A) is granted, it is for the personal representative to
decide whether to enter the case. If he decides to enter the case, he will
cause the amended complaint to be filed; if he decides not to enter the
case, or if he does not file the amended complaint within a reasonable
time after the court grants leave to do so, the original complaint should
be stricken from the files for failure of commencement.
If the original plaintiff's attorney discovers the death before the defen-
dant challenges, the problem becomes more difficult. A Rule 17(A) mo-
tion to substitute the personal representative cannot be made because
there is no plaintiff to make it. Likewise, a Rule 25(A) motion to substi-
tute cannot be made by the personal representative since Rule 25(A) does
not apply. In this situation, it would appear that the proper procedure is
a Civil Rule 24(A)(2) motion to intervene as a substitute for the named
plaintiff. The Rule 24(C) pleading which would accompany such a motion
would be an amended complaint substituting the personal representative
for the named plaintiff. All things being equal, the court should grant the
motion to intervene and should permit the service and filing of the
amended complaint. In either of these events, since the amended com-
plaint does not change the cause of action, but merely changes the party-
plaintiff, the amended complaint will relate back to the original com-
plaint under the provisions of Rule 15(C), and the action will be deemed
commenced by the personal representative as of the date the original
complaint was filed under the provisions of Civil Rule 17(A). These rules
should also apply when the action is brought by an entity that has no
legal existence at the time the complaint is filed; the real parties in inter-
est should be substituted for the nonexistent entity."'
Substitution may also be allowed under Rule 17(A) when an action is
brought in a representative capacity by one who has real or legal exis-
tence as an individual or entity, but who has no legal existence as repre-
"I See e.g., Levering v. Riverside Methodist Hosp., 2 Ohio App. 3d 157, 441 N.E.2d 290
(10th Dist. 1981)(Franklin County).
' This is, in effect, what the supreme court did in State ex rel. Cleveland Mun. Court v.
Cleveland City Council, 34 Ohio St. 2d 120, 296 N.E.2d 544 (1973), when it simply deemed
the action to have been brought by the individual judges of the Cleveland Municipal Court
and the counterclaim to have been brought by the individual council members of the Cleve-
land City Council. See id. at 121-22, 296 N.E.2d at 546-47.
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sentative. Typical is the action brought by a purported executor or ad-
ministrator who has not been formally appointed at the time the
complaint is filed.' 97 Here, however, ratification would be an appropriate
cure. Since the action was brought by an existing person or entity, any
acts as an individual or as an entity may be ratified by the same person
or entity as executor or administrator after formal appointment as
such.'98 For the sake of the record, however, and because Ohio has had
very little reported experience with ratification, substitution after ap-
pointment, even though a mere paper transaction, would be a more ap-
propriate remedy.
Despite the possibility of cure by ratification, joinder, or substitution,
the most important lesson to be learned from the cases discussed in this
subsection is the converse of that taught by the supreme court in Barn-
hart v. Schultz. 9' The plaintiff's attorney should ascertain the real or
legal existence of his client before filing the complaint, or he should file
the complaint early enough in the statutory period of limitation to allow
him to bring a new action if it later develops that his client was not in
existence at the time the complaint was filed. Cure by ratification, join-
der, or substitution is, after all, a measure of desperation, and there is no
guarantee that it will be successful.
D. The Capacity to Sue or Be Sued
If the plaintiff does not have legal capacity to sue at the time the com-
plaint is filed and if that lack of capacity is not cured prior to the entry of
final judgment, no action is commenced by that plaintiff. °0 Likewise, if
the defendant does not have legal capacity to be sued at the time the
complaint is filed and if that lack of capacity is not cured prior to the
entry of final judgment, no action is commenced against ,that
defendant."0 '
The cure for lack of capacity depends upon the cause. If a plaintiff
lacks the capacity to sue because of minority or incompetency, it may be
117 See, e.g., Douglas v. Daniel Bros. Coal Co., 135 Ohio St. 641, 22 N.E.2d 195 (1939).
"I' Id. at 645, 22 N.E.2d at 197. In this case the amended petition not only substituted
the widow as administratrix for the widow as individual, but also expressly ratified the acts
performed by the widow as individual. Id.
'" 53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978), rev,d on other grounds, Baker v. McKnight,
4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983). See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
'o See Walsh v. J.R. Thomas' Sons, 91 Ohio St. 210, 110 N.E. 454 (1915); Cobble v.
Farmers' Bank, 63 Ohio St. 528, 59 N.E. 221 (1900); SES, Inc. v. Scott, No. WD-81-44 (Ohio
6th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 1981)(Wood County); Citizens Loan & Say. Ass'n v. Kricken-
berger, 46 Ohio App. 228, 188 N.E. 396 (2d Dist. 1932)(Darke County); GMS Management
Co. v. Axe, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1982).
See Barnhart v. Schultz, 53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 372 N.E.2d 589 (1978), rev'd on other
grounds, Baker v. McKnight, 4 Ohio St. 3d 125, 447 N.E.2d 104 (1983); Little v. Little, No.
6197 (Ohio 2d Dist. Ct. App. June 27, 1979)(Montgomery County).
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cured by joining a "next friend," or the plaintiffs duly appointed guard-
ian "or other like fiduciary," or by appointing a guardian ad litem to re-
present the plaintiff.20 Likewise, if the defendant lacks the capacity to be
sued because of minority or incompetency, a cure can be effectuated by
joining the defendant's duly appointed guardian or other fiduciary, or by
appointing a guardian ad litem to represent the defendant. 02 If an indi-
vidual, partnership, corporation, or other legal entity lacks the capacity to
sue because of a failure to register a fictitious name with the appropriate
state official, this lack of capacity can be cured by the registration of the
name.20 4 If a foreign corporation lacks the capacity to sue because it has
not obtained a license to do business in Ohio, this defect can be cured by
compliance with the licensing laws205
To be effective for commencement purposes, however, the cure must be
accomplished prior to the entry of final judgment. If it is, it is deemed to
relate back to the filing of the complaint and, all other things being equal,
the action is deemed commenced as of the date the complaint was filed.2 0e
If cure is not accomplished before final judgment, the action fails of com-
mencement, and the judgment is void.2 0 7
In the Ohio system, capacity to sue or be sued is presumed, 08 and lack
of capacity to sue or be sued is a quasi-affirmative defense. 0 9 Thus, if the
defense of lack of capacity is not properly raised either by motion or re-
sponsive pleading, it is waived,2"' and so, too, is the defense of failure of
commencement to the extent that the latter defense is premised on lack
202 OHIO R. Civ. P. 17(B).
I02 ld.
20, See GMS Management Co. v. Axe, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1982); OHIo
REv. CODE ANN. § 1329.10(B) (Page 1979); id. § 1777.04 (Page 1978).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1703.29 (Page 1978).
200 See cases cited supra note 200. If the statute which deprives the plaintiff of capacity
to sue makes no provision for cure after the complaint has been filed, the cure cannot be
accomplished at all, and the action must fail of commencement. National Computerized
Employment Serv., Inc. v. Advanced Robotics Corp., No. CA-2839 (Ohio 5th Dist. Ct. App.
Oct. 15, 1982)(Licking County).
262 Cobble v. Farmers' Bank, 63 Ohio St. 528, 59 N.E.2d 221 (1900).
208 E.g., Crow Motor Sales, Inc. v. Eyestone, 31 Ohio App. 2d 35, 285 N.E.2d 894 (3d Dist.
1972)(Wyandot County). OHIO R. Civ. P. 9(A) states: "It is not necessary to aver the capac-
ity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representa-
tive capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a
party."
209 In the words of OHIo R. Civ. P. 9(A):
When a party desires to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any party or the
capacity of any party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific negative averment,
which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the
pleader's knowledge.
20 Akron Nat'l Bank v. Mathers, No. 9008 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 4, 1979)(Sum-
mit County); GMS Management Co. v. Axe, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Cloy. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1982).
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of capacity to sue or be sued.21 To this rule of waiver, however, there is
at least one exception: If lack of capacity to sue is imposed by statute as a
penalty for not complying with other statutory requirements, that lack of
capacity to sue (and failure of commencement to the extent that it is
based on lack of capacity to sue) cannot be waived by the defendants
because a waiver would violate the public policy underlying the statutory
deprivation of capacity to sue."'
IV. THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT
A. The Relation Back to the Date of Filing
Assume the existence of all of the elements of commencement except
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, and suppose the following
two situations:
1. The complaint is filed on August 1, 1984, and effective service is
obtained nine months later, on May 1, 1985.
2. The complaint is filed on August 1, 1984, and effective service is
obtained fourteen months later, on October 1, 1985.
In the first situation, the action is commenced as of August 1, 1984.
The effective service on May 1, 1985, relates back to the date on which
the complaint was filed, so that the date of commencement is the date on
which the complaint was filed and not the date on which jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is acquired. '
In the second situation, if the defendant has not waived the defense of
failure of commencement, the action is not commenced at all; rather, at
the stroke of midnight on August 1, 1985, the action "self-destructs," and
all that was done prior to that date is void and a nullity. 1 " However, it
has been held that if effective service occurs more than a year after the
filing of the complaint, but prior to the expiration of the statute of limita-
tions, the action is deemed commenced as of the date of service.2ll This
GMS Management Co., 5 Ohio Misc. 2d at 9.
Cobble v. Farmers' Bank, 63 Ohio St. 528, 539, 59 N.E. 221, 223 (1900); GMS Manage-
ment Co., 5 Ohio Misc. 2d at 10.
"I St. Thomas Hosp. v. Beal, 2 Ohio App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 1240 (9th Dist. 1981)(Sum-
mit County); Fieno v. Beaton, 68 Ohio App. 2d 13, 426 N.E.2d 203 (tst Dist. 1980)(Hamilton
County); Yancey v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist. 1975)(Hamilton
County).
"I Saunders v. Choi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984); Maryhew v. Yova, 11
Ohio St. 3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984); Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63, 362 N.E.2d 642
(1977); Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966); Kossuth v. Bear, 161
Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954); Conway v. Smith, 66 Ohio App. 2d 65, 419 N.E.2d 1117
(8th Dist. 1979)(Cuyahoga County); GMS Management Co. v. Axe, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Clev.
Hts. Mun. Ct. 1982).
2. St. Thomas Hosp. v. Beal, 2 Ohio App. 3d 132, 440 N.E.2d 1240 (9th Dist. 1981)(Sum-
mit County).
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holding is incorrect; not only is it inconsistent with all other decisions on
point, but it cannot be sustained by any fair reading of either section
2305.17 or Civil Rule 3(A).
In any event, the general rule with respect to the date of commence-
ment is this: If all the elements of commencement are satisfied, an action
is commenced as to a given party on the date on which there is filed with
the court a pleading which asserts a claim by or against that party. There
is one exception to this general rule: When an amended pleading substi-
tutes a new party for an original party who had no real or legal existence
at the time the original pleading was filed, the amended pleading relates
back to the date of the original pleading, and the action is deemed com-
menced as to the substitute party as of the date the original pleading was
filed.
B. An "Action Attempted to Be Commenced"
The operation of a number of the Civil Rules is expressly conditioned
upon the commencement of the action. Civil Rule 30(A), for example,
states: "After commencement of the action, any party may take the testi-
mony of any person, including a party, by deposition upon oral examina-
tion." The problem presented by Rules such as this is: What is meant by
the word "commencement"?
If the word is understood in terms of its meaning in section 2305.17 or
Civil Rule 3(A), some interesting difficulties are presented. In the first
scenario described in the previous section, for example, there was a nine-
month period of time during which it was not known whether the action
had been commenced, and in the second situation described in the previ-
ous section, there was a twelve-month period of time before it was known
that the action had not been commenced. Could depositions be taken
during that nine-month or twelve-month period, or would the parties
have to wait until there was effective service before they could begin dis-
covery? If "commencement" is given its strict meaning, one could argue
logically that no discovery can take place until the commencement of the
action had been determined. However, such a conclusion would be incon-
sistent with Civil Rule I(B), which enjoins a construction of the Civil
Rules that will eliminate "delay, unnecessary expense and all other im-
pediments to the expeditious administration of justice." Further, in any
given case, a determination that the attempted service was effective so as
to commence the action may very well depend upon the plaintiff's ability
to obtain discovery from the defendant or from some third person. Not
infrequently this is the case when "long-arm" service is attempted under
Civil Rule 4.3. Yet, if Civil Rule 30(A)'s "commencement" is read in its
strict sense, the plaintiff is in a "dog chasing its tail" situation; he cannot
take the necessary depositions until after he has established that the ac-
tion has been commenced, and he cannot establish that the action has
been commenced until after he has taken the depositions. When the in-
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terpretation of a Civil Rule leads to such an absurd result, that interpre-
tation must be rejected. Therefore, when the word "commencement" ap-
pears in a Civil Rule, such as Rule 30(A), it must be given a meaning
other than that of Civil Rule 3(A); but how is it to be read? That ques-
tion might be better phrased: What is the status of the action between
the time the complaint is filed and the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
defendant or the expiration of the one-year period, whichever first
occurs?
The first part of the answer may be found in section 2305.19. In perti-
nent part, that statute states:
In an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced,
if the plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, and the time
limited for the commencement of such action at the date of...
failure has expired, the plaintiff, or, if he dies and the cause of
action survives, his representatives may commence a new action
within one year after such date.
2 16
This statute contrasts an action "commenced" with an action "attempted
to be commenced." Obviously, they are two different things, and the dif-
ference between them provides the ultimate answer to the question posed
above. To discover that difference-and discover the second part of the
answer-it is necessary to examine the language of section 2305.17 as it
read before the 1965 amendment:
Within the meaning of such sections [i.e., the various statutes
of limitation], an attempt to commence an action is equivalent to
its commencement, when the party diligently endeavors to pro-
cure a service, if such attempt is followed by service within sixty
days.21
7
Thus, during that period of time following the filing of the complaint in
which the plaintiff is diligently endeavoring to procure a service, the
plaintiff is "attempting to commence the action," and the status of the
action during that period of time is that of "an action attempted to be
commenced. '218 If the plaintiff obtains jurisdiction over the person of the
"e OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1981).
Id. § 2305.17 (Page 1954).
" As it is noted in Howard v. Allen, 28 Ohio App. 2d 275, 277 N.E.2d 239 (1971), aff'd on
other grounds, 30 Ohio St. 2d 130, 283 N.E.2d 167 (1972):
R.C. 2305.19 applies also if the original action was "attempted to be com-
menced." This poses a more vexing problem. In [Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d
212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966)], the Supreme Court applied a statutory definition of
what constituted an attempt to commence an action. That statute, R.C. 2305.17,
was amended in 1965 to delete the definition of "attempted commencement," and
modified the definition of "commencement" to essentially the same definition as
contained in Civil Rule 3(A). There is now no definition of what constitutes an
action attempted to be commenced within the meaning of R.C. 2305.19 set forth
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defendant within the year, the status of the action shifts from "an action
attempted to be commenced" to "an action commenced"; but if the year
expires without the acquisition of jurisdiction, the status of the action
shifts from "an action attempted to be commenced" to "an action that
has failed of commencement." This "action attempted to be commenced"
simply self-destructs.
For procedural purposes, "an action attempted to be commenced" is
treated in all respects as if it were "an action commenced." If the "action
attempted to be commenced" later becomes "an action commenced," all
that was done during the "attempted to be commenced" period is vali-
dated; but if the "action attempted to be commenced" later becomes "an
action that has failed of commencement," it was no action at all-it never
existed-and all that was done during the "attempted to be commenced
period" is void and a nullity. Thus, when Rules such as Rule 30(A) speak
of something that may be done "after commencement of the action," they
refer to those actions occurring "after the action has attempted to be
commenced by the filing of the complaint."
An "action attempted to be commenced" has one very interesting, if
somewhat perplexing, characteristic-if the action is terminated for any
reason other than failure of commencement, the very act of termination
transforms it into an action commenced. Thus, if an action attempted to
be commenced is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the
dismissal results in the commencement of the action. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature of commencement. As pointed out in Kossuth
v. Bear,2" an action that has not been commenced does not exist; if the
action does not exist, no judgment can be entered in that action, be it a
judgment on the merits or other than on the merits, and the only legiti-
mate action the court can take is to strike the complaint from the files for
failure of commencement. But Section 2305.19 recognizes that actions at-
tempted to be commenced can fail either on the merits or otherwise than
on the merits; that is, a court can enter a judgment in an "action at-
tempted to be commenced." However, such an action can sustain a judg-
ment only if it is an action commenced. Therefore, it must necessarily
follow that the termination of an "action attempted to be commenced"
either by statute or civil rule. Unless it can be held that the definition, of an
attempt to commence an action, of former 2305.17 continues to define the terms
used in R.C. 2305.19, it would appear that the good faith filing of a complaint
followed by service within one year from such filing, which service is later deter-
mined to be ineffective, would constitute an attempt to commence the action
within the meaning of R.C. 2305.19.
28 Ohio App. 2d at 277, 277 N.E.2d at 241. The court was correct in concluding that former
§ 2305.17 continues to define the term "attempted to be commenced" as found in
§ 2305.19; it was incorrect in its speculation that a defective service made within the year
constitutes an action "attempted to be commenced." See Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63,
362 N.E.2d 642 (1977).
219 161 Ohio St. 378, 383-84, 119 N.E.2d 285, 288 (1954). See supra note 1.
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for any reason other than failure of commencement results in the com-
mencement of that action.
In any given case, the application of Civil Rule 1(B) would require the
same result. An "action attempted to be commenced" is not an action
commenced, and accordingly it cannot bear a judgment. Therefore, if the
"action attempted to be commenced" is challenged on a ground other
than failure of commencement, the trial court would have to ascertain
first if the action had been commenced before it could sustain that chal-
lenge; but such a determination might require the court to wait out the
year following the filing of the complaint. Such a year-long delay in ruling
on a challenge to the action is wholly inconsistent with the requirement
of Civil Rule 1(B) that the Civil Rules be construed to eliminate delay.
Therefore, if Civil Rule 1(B) is to be given effect, it must necessarily fol-
low that the sustaining of a challenge to an "action attempted to be com-
menced"-other than a challenge based on failure of commence-
ment-results in the commencement of the action.
V. CHALLENGING FAILURE OF COMMENCEMENT
A. Why the Challenge Must Be Made: Commencement by Default
Failure of commencement goes to the existence of the action itself.
Therefore, to an extent, the defense of failure of commencement is a chal-
lenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction; in effect, it says that the
court may not exercise its subject matter jurisdiction because there is no
action in existence for which that jurisdiction can be exercised. This is
not a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction in general, but is
a challenge to its subject matter jurisdiction in a particular action. Unlike
a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction over a particular
type or category of action, which cannot be waived, this is a challenge to
the court's subject matter jurisdiction over an individual case within that
type or category, and as such, it can be waived.2 2 Accordingly, if it is not
timely and properly asserted, the defense of failure of commencement is
waived, and the result is commencement by default.
B. Failure of Commencement: The Appropriate Defense
1. Not Contained in Other Defenses
The defense of failure of commencement is truly a "forgotten"22 ' de-
22 Cf. Mantho v. Board of Liquor Control, 162 Ohio St. 37, 122 N.E.2d 14 (1954)(failure
of liquor license applicants to object to prosecution of an appeal waived the defense that the
court of appeals had no subject matter jurisdiction.)
2" The term is Scigliano's. See Scigliano, supra note 5.
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fense for two reasons: 1) it is not expressly mentioned in the Rules but is
found by implication from what is said in Civil Rule 3(A); and 2) it arises
out of the applicability of explicit Rules' defenses such as the defense of
lack of jurisdiction over the person or lack of capacity to sue or be sued.
It is, perhaps, this latter point that creates the most difficulty for the
pleader. Even though failure of commencement arises out of some other
defense, it is not an inherent part of that other defense but is, rather, a
separate and distinct defense in its own right. A comparison of the result
achieved by the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person and the
result achieved by failure of commencement will demonstrate the accu-
racy of this conclusion. Suppose that the plaintiff does not obtain juris-
diction over the person of the defendant within one year of the filing of
the complaint. This is the essential prerequisite to both the Civil Rule
12(B)(2) defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person and the Civil Rule
3(A) defense of failure of commencement. If the defendant moves to dis-
miss the action for lack of jurisdiction over the person, the action will be
dismissed other than upon the merits.2 ' Since this is a "failure" other
than upon the merits, section 2305.19 will come into play if the dismissal
took place after the statute of limitations expired, and the plaintiff will
have a year from the date of the dismissal in which to commence a new
action. If, on the other hand, the defendant moves to strike the complaint
from the files for failure of commencement, the complaint will be strick-
en, but the action will not be dismissed.22 3 Since striking the complaint
from the files is a judicial declaration that no action ever existed, no ac-
tion has "failed" within the meaning of section 2305.19, and the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations will bar the commencement of a new
action.22 Since the results achieved by these two defenses are strikingly
different, it follows that the defenses themselves must be different and
that neither is contained in the other. If neither defense is contained in
the other, it also follows that both must be asserted separately, or the one
not asserted is waived.
In sum, failure of commencement is a separate and distinct defense. It
is not raised by the assertion of the applicable Rules defense out of which
it arises; to avoid its waiver, it must be asserted separately.
222 See OHIO R. Civ. P. 41(B)(4): "A dismissal (a) for lack of jurisdiction over the person
. . . shall operate as a failure otherwise than upon the merits."
223 Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954). See supra note 1 for a more
complete discussion of this point.
•" Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213 (1966); Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio
St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954). See also Browne, supra note 98, at 483-84 ("savings provi-
sion" of § 2305.19 does not apply after court has granted a motion to strike a complaint
from the files for failure of commencement).
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2. Not Waived by Being Joined with Other Defenses
If the defense of failure of commencement and the Rules' defense out
of which it arises can produce inconsistent results, can both be asserted in
the same pleading, or will the assertion of both result in the waiver of
failure of commencement? The answer may be found in Civil Rules
8(E)(2) and 12(B). In pertinent part, Civil Rule 8(E)(2) states:
A party may also state as many separate. . . defenses as he has
regardless of consistency and whether based on legal or equitable
grounds.
Civil Rule 12(B) provides:
Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any plead-
ing, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one
is required . . . . No defense or objection is waived by being
joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a respon-
sive pleading or motion.
Thus, the defense of failure of commencement will not be waived merely
because it is joined with some other defense in the same pleading or mo-
tion. However, when it comes time to press for the adjudication of the
various defenses asserted, the pleader may well have to elect between his
defenses. If the pleader presses for the adjudication of the Rules' defense
out of which failure of commencement arises, without also pressing for an
adjudication of the failure of commencement defense in the alternative,
his election of the Rules' defense, if sustained, will result in the waiver of
the failure of commencement defense since the sustaining of the Rules
defense will result in the commencement of the action.
225
C. Who May Assert the Defense
1. The Defendant
Since failure of commencement is a defense, it is obvious that the de-
fendant may assert it. Since it is a waivable defense, however, the defen-
dant need not assert it, and if he does not the action will be commenced
by default. Indeed, if the defendant has a good defense on the merits and
the statute of limitations would not bar a second action, it might be to
the defendant's advantage not to assert it, since the successful assertion
of the failure of commencement defense in the first action would simply
invite a second action, prolong the litigation, and increase the costs to the
defendant. In such a case, the better part of wisdom would allow the first
"I See supra section IV. B.
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action to commence by default and then move for summary judgment on
the defense on the merits.
2. The Problem of Multiple Defendants
In the abstract, commencement deals with the existence of the action
as such. Therefore, if the action is commenced as to any defendant, it
should be deemed commenced as to all. Rule 3(A), however, links com-
mencement to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the defendant. Al-
though the purpose of this linkage is to establish a failure-to-prosecute
time point after which the court would be justified in dismissing an ac-
tion as to those defendants not served,22 it has the unfortunate result of
requiring the action to be separately commenced as to each defendant
named in the complaint.227 Thus in any given case, the action may be
commenced as to some defendants but not as to others.22
Suppose that at the end of the year following the filing of the com-
plaint, several of the named defendants remain unserved. If one of these
defendants successfully asserts the defense of failure of commencement,
should the ruling on that defense inure to the benefit of the others in the
same situation? There does not seem to be any reported decision on this
point, but the correct answer would appear to be in the negative. The
defense of failure of commencement should be considered a defense per-
sonal to each defendant, and the defense should be deemed waived as to
those defendants who do not assert it. But an exception to this rule would
be justified if all of the defendants remain unserved at the end of the
year. In such case, the ruling with respect to the defendant who raised the
defense could legitimately inure to the benefit of all, since it would fur-
ther the purpose of Rule 3(A)-clearing the docket of cases in which ser-
vice has not been obtained in one year.
2 28
May a defendant who has been served raise the defense of failure of
commencement on behalf of one who has not? Again, as a general rule,
the answer should be in the negative because the defense is personal and
granting it in this instance would not clear the docket since the case
would proceed as to the defendant who had been served. However, if the
defendant who had not been served was an indispensable party, and if
the action could not proceed in his absence, 2 0 the result should be other-
..6 See note 117 and accompanying text. OHIo R. Civ. P. 4(E), on the other hand, estab-
lishes a separate and distinct six-month failure-to-prosecute time point for the dismissal of
actions as to those defendants who have not been served. How these two Rules are to be
reconciled remains to be seen. In any event, with the enactment of Civil Rule 4(E), it is no
longer necessary to link commencement with the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant. See Browne, supra note 5, at 164-65.
"' Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63, 64-65, 362 N.E.2d 642, 643 (1977).
228 Id.
, See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
o See OHIo R. Civ. P. 19(B).
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wise; in this instance, granting the defense of failure of commencement as
to the unserved defendant would result in the action being dismissed as
to the served defendant for failure to join an indispensable party, and
Rule 3(A)'s goal of clearing the docket would be achieved.
3. The Plaintiff
There are occasions when the plaintiff may find some comfort in his
own failure to commence the action. Suppose that the defendant has filed
an answer in which he includes the defenses of insufficiency of service of
process, lack of jurisdiction over the person, and failure of commence-
ment. A Rule 12(D) preliminary determination of those defenses is not
sought by either party.2 31 Shortly after the trial of the action begins, but
before the court rules on those defenses, the plaintiff's attorney is noti-
fied that his key witness, whom he has carelessly failed to subpoena, will
not appear as promised. If the plaintiff proceeds with the trial, he will
lose; but if he can withdraw the case from the court's consideration, there
is still time left on the statute of limitations in which to bring a new
action. Unfortunately, he cannot voluntarily dismiss the action by notice
since the trial has commenced, and the defendant will not stipulate to a
voluntary dismissal. Further, the judge will neither grant a continuance
nor a voluntary dismissal by court order because the plaintiff failed to
subpoena the witness. Can the plaintiff withdraw the case from the
court's consideration by moving to strike his own complaint on the
ground that the defendant's defense of failure of commencement is well
taken, and there is no existing action before the court?
Although there is a natural reluctance to allow a party to profit from
his own procedural error, the Rules are not concerned with procedural
profit or loss; they are intended to facilitate the trial of cases on their
merits when trial is warranted.132 Since allowing the plaintiff to terminate
the present action so that he can bring a second action is consistent with
the intent of the Civil Rules, and since this would be the exact result if
the defendant pressed the defense of failure of commencement, there
does not seem to be anything in principle which would prevent the plain-
tiff from taking advantage of his own failure to commence the action or
from moving to strike his own complaint from the files on this ground.
Further, there is nothing in the Civil Rules which prohibits the plaintiff
from conceding the validity of a defense which the defendant has as-
231 See, e.g., First Bank of Marietta v. Cline, 12 Ohio St. 3d 317, 466 N.E.2d 567
(1984)(defendant did not waive affirmative defenses asserted in answer by failure to request
a preliminary hearing under Rule 12(D)); Browne, Civil Rule 12(D): Defusing the Time
Bomb, 55 CLEV. B.J. 104 (1984)(describing advantages of using Rule 12(D) motion to obtain
pretrial rulings on defenses asserted in answer).
"' See OHio R. Civ. P. I(B) and the cases cited in Justice Clifford Brown's dissent in
First Bank of Marietta v. Cline, 12 Ohio St. 3d 317, 319, 466 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1984).
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serted, and that, in effect, is what the plaintiff is doing when he moves to
strike his own complaint for failure of commencement. The defendant
can hardly complain if the plaintiff then takes advantage of the proce-
dural situation in which he finds himself after conceding the validity of
the defendant's defense. If the defendant wished to avoid this result, he
could have waived the defense which made it possible. Under the right
circumstances, then, the plaintiff can also assert failure of commence-
ment, although it stretches the point to call it a defense when the plain-
tiff directs the question to his own action.
4. The Court on Its Own Initiative
May the trial court, on its own initiative, terminate an action for failure
of commencement? Although the authority on this point is sparse, it an-
swers the question affirmatively. Thus, in Saunders v. Choi,2" the Court
of Appeals for Cuyahoga County stated:
The trial court could have taken such action sua sponte so ap-
pellant's stated assignment of error that the attorney did not
have the authority to make the motion is irrelevant to our deci-
sion. Striking a complaint for failure of service is an appropriate
action to clear a court's docket. The entry "dismissing" the com-
plaint in this case should be read as an order "striking" the
complaint.2 34
This, of course, is consistent with the principle of Rule 3(A) that cases
should be cleared from the docket if jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant has not been acquired within one year following the filing of
the complaint; 235 to this end it does not matter whether the court acts on
its own initiative,"' on the initiative of the defendant, or even on the
initiative of the plaintiff.2 7
"I No. 45101 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), aff'd on other
grounds, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984).
... Id. slip op. at 7. See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pitstick, 7 Ohio Misc. 2d 53 (C.P.
Hamilton County 1983), in which the court appears to have acted on its own initiative in
"dismissing" the action for failure of commencement.
2. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Saunders v. Choi:
Among other things, the purpose of Civ. R. 3(A) is designed to promote the
prompt and orderly resolution of litigation, as well as eliminating the unnecessary
clogging of court dockets caused by undue delay. The rule puts litigants on notice
that a reasonable time will be afforded in order to obtain service of process over
defendants. Such a rule goes to the essence of civil procedure and is not, in our
view, a mere technicality designed to deny parties their day in court.
12 Ohio St. 3d at 250, 466 N.E.2d at 893.
226 See OHIo R. Civ. P. 4(E) which expressly grants the court the power to dismiss a case
on its own initiative if service is not obtained on the defendant within six months after
filing the complaint.
237 See supra section V.C. 3.
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If the trial court decides to act on its own initiative, must it first give
the plaintiffs attorney notice and an opportunity to be heard? The tech-
nical answer to this question depends upon the answer to a second ques-
tion: Can the plaintiff's attorney put forth any reasonable argument or
set forth any set of circumstances from which it might be concluded that
the action was commenced? If the answer to this question is in the af-
firmative, then elementary concepts of due process would require a notice
from the court and an opportunity to be heard. If, however, it is abso-
lutely clear from the record that the action had not been commenced, 38
then notice and hearing would serve no useful purpose; with the expira-
tion of the year in which to obtain service, the "action attempted to be
commenced" simply self-destructs, and there is nothing which the plain-
tiff can do to change that result. Therefore, the court's action in termi-
nating the litigation is simply an express confirmation of a state of facts
apparent from the face of the record. Where no cure is possible and no
challenge to the record may be maintained, no notice and hearing is
required.
D. When May the Defense Be Asserted
As a general rule, a defense need not be asserted until it becomes
"available"2 39 to the pleader; it becomes "available" when it is ripe for
adjudication.2 40 This does not mean, however, that a pleader cannot as-
sert a defense that is not yet "available" at the time of its assertion. If the
pleader anticipates that the defense will mature before the time of its
adjudication then he may assert it although it would not be ripe for adju-
dication-that is, even though it would not be an "available" defense-at
the time of its assertion. Consider the answer as an example. Subject to
the provisions of Civil Rules 12(D) and 56, defenses included in the an-
swer will ordinarily not be adjudicated until the time of trial. Therefore,
if the pleader legitimately anticipates the maturation of a defense prior to
the time of trial, he may include that defense in his answer even though
that defense would not be ripe for adjudication at the time the answer
was served and filed.
To a more limited extent, the same is true when a motion is the vehicle
for asserting the defense. If the pleader legitimately anticipates that the
defense will mature before the court rules on the motion, then he may
assert that defense by motion even though it is not "available" at the
time the motion is served and filed. However, since the time between the
service of the motion and the court's ruling on it is relatively short-it
' See, e.g., Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St. 3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984)(service upon
defendant was not obtained during the one year following the filing of the complaint.).
'39 See OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(G), 15(E).
110 The problem of "availability" is discussed at greater length in Browne, supra note 98,
at 470.
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could be as short as seven days24' -it is obvious that few defenses will
mature between the service of the motion and its disposition by the court.
Accordingly, a motion is not a very practical vehicle for asserting an "un-
available" defense; as a general rule, it may be said that only "available"
defenses can be asserted by motion.
The timing of the failure of commencement defense and the vehicle by
which it is presented to the court is thus determined by its "availability,"
and its "availability" is, in turn, determined by the "availability" of the.
underlying Rules' defense out of which it arises.
Ordinarily, the Civil Rule 9(A) defenses of nonexistence and lack of
capacity to sue or to be sued will be available at the time the complaint is
filed. Therefore, if either of these defenses is the underlying cause of fail-
ure of commencement, the failure of commencement defense can be as-
serted at any time within twenty-eight days after the service of the sum-
mons and complaint242 or within the time for response as extended by
court order under the provisions of Civil Rule 6(B).2""
If the underlying cause of failure of commencement is lack of jurisdic-
tion over the person of the defendant, the problem of "availability" be-
comes more complex. 2 14 As a general rule, the Civil Rule 12(B)(2) lack of
jurisdiction defense can arise out of any one or more of three separate
and distinct situations: 1) there is no constitutional basis for the court's
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over the defendant; 2) there has been
no service of a summons on the defendant; or 3) the summons served on
the defendant was insufficient under Rule 12(B)(4), or 12(B)(5), or
both.2
4 5
A typical example of the first situation is an action against an out-of-
state defendant who is not impliedly present in Ohio and who has had no
substantial minimum contacts with Ohio. In such case, the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States would prohibit an Ohio court from exercising in personam jurisdic-
tion over the out-of-state defendant, and it is fair to say that the court
thus lacks jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.4 " In most cases,
the existence of this condition will be apparent at the time the complaint
is filed, so that both the 12(B)(2) defense of lack of jurisdiction and the
concommitant defense of failure of commencement will be "available" at
that time. Accordingly, either or both defenses can be asserted within the
241 See OHio R. Civ. P. 6(D).
2.. See OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(A)(1).
243 See Browne, supra note 98, at 449-51.
2.. For a more extensive discussion of this problem see Browne, supra note 98, at 473-84.
2". Id.
2,1 See, e.g., Kleinfeld v. Link, 9 Ohio App. 3d 29, 457 N.E.2d 1187 (3d Dist. 1983)(Allen
County); Ohio State Tie & Timber, Inc. v. Paris Lumber Co., 8 Ohio App. 3d 236, 456
N.E.2d 1309 (10th Dist. 1982)(Franklin County); Culp v. Polytechnic Inst., 7 Ohio App. 3d
352, 455 N.E.2d 698 (loth Dist. 1982)(Franklin County).
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time prescribed for the defendant's response to the complaint-normally
within twenty-eight days after the service of the complaint and the
summons.
The second situation-no service of summons-can be divided into at
least three situations: 1) service was not effected because the named de-
fendant was not in existence at the time of attempted service; 2) service
was not effected because the defendant could not be located; or 3) no
attempt at service was ever made (e.g., through oversight, the clerk's of-
fice never issued a summons for a particular defendant, and as a result,
none was ever served).
In situation 1), the defense of lack of jurisdiction and the defense of
failure of commencement both become available when the fact of nonexis-
tence is spread upon the record. However, since the defendant does not
exist, there is no party who can assert either defense. In this situation, it
is the court, acting on its own initiative, who may "assert" the defense of
failure of commencement by striking the complaint from the files. 47
Situations 2) and 3) present a different problem. Civil Rule 3(A) gives
the plaintiff a year following the filing of the complaint in which to ob-
tain service. Therefore, unless some fact of record makes it obvious that
service will never be effected, the court cannot reach the conclusion that
there has been no service until the expiration of the year granted by Rule
3(A). Accordingly, neither lack of jurisdiction nor failure of commence-
ment becomes "available" until that time. 48 Of course, if some fact of
record makes it obvious that service will never be effected, the court need
not necessarily wait out the year before making a determination that the
action has failed of commencement; in such case, both lack of jurisdiction
and failure of commencement become "available" whenever the record
positively and unquestionably reflects that service will not be made.2 49
At this point, Civil Rule 4(E) complicates the equation. In substance,
the Rule provides that if there has been no attempt to obtain service
within six months following the filing of the complaint, the action may be
dismissed without prejudice either on the court's own motion or at the
instance of the defendant. Does this bring forward the defenses of lack of
jurisdiction and failure of commencement so that under this Rule they
now become "available" at the six-month mark? The answer is negative.
The basis for a Civil Rule 4(E) dismissal is failure to prosecute, not lack
of jurisdiction."' Further, a dismissal of the action is wholly inconsistent
with failure of commencement and is not a remedy for failure of com-
mencement; the only authorized remedy for failure of commencement is
' See supra notes 233-38 and accompanying text.
'4' Yancey v. Pyles, 44 Ohio App. 2d 410, 339 N.E.2d 835 (1st Dist. 1975)(Hamilton
County); Hayden v. Ours, 44 Ohio Misc. 62 (C.P. Paulding County 1975).
1,9 Lozier v. Thorne, No. 5-78-34 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. May 25, 1979)(Hancock
County).
2o Browne, supra note 5, at 164.
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the striking of the complaint from the files. 25 1 Finally, that which is dis-
missed under the provisions of Civil Rule 4(E) is an "action attempted to
be commenced," and as was noted elsewhere,2 52 the dismissal of an "ac-
tion attempted to be commenced" results in the commencement of that
action. Therefore, Civil Rule 4(E) does not bring forward to the six-
month mark the defense of failure of commencement; rather, the applica-
tion of Rule 4(E) to any given case will actually result in the destruction
of failure of commencement as a defense.
Civil Rule 4(E) and other exceptional circumstances aside, in situations
2) and 3), the defense of failure of commencement will not be "available"
until the end of the year following the filing of the complaint. This does
not mean, however, that it cannot be asserted at some earlier time. While
it is unlikely that it could be asserted by a motion prior to the end of the
year, it could be included in a responsive pleading if the defender chose
to serve such a pleading. The defense of failure of commencement is not
susceptible to a Civil Rule 12(D) pre-trial determination because it is not
a Rule 12(B) defense, 5 ' and it is not the proper subject for a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment, since summary judgment contemplates a
determination on the merits.25' Therefore, if it is included in a responsive
pleading, the defense will not be adjudicated until the trial of the ac-
tion. 55 In situations 2) and 3), however, the trial of the action cannot
take place until more than one year following the filing of the complaint
because, under the terms of Civil Rule 3(A), the court must give the
plaintiff at least that length of time to perfect service. Therefore, the de-
fender can anticipate that the defense will mature, if at all, before the
trial of the action, and he can legitimately include the defense in his re-
sponsive pleading.
The third situation presents many of the same problems that were
found in the second. If service was effected on the defendant, the quash-
ing of the summons for insufficiency of process or the quashing of the
service for insufficiency of service of process is a prerequisite to a finding
of lack of jurisdiction over the person and, by extension, a prerequisite to
a finding of failure of commencement. The quashing of the service or the
summons will not immediately give rise to either defense; Civil Rule 3(A)
gives the plaintiff a year in which to effect service. Therefore, if the plain-
tiff persists in attempting to get valid service (thereby precluding the ap-
plication of Civil Rule 4(E)), the defenses of lack of personal jurisdiction
and failure of commencement will not become "available" until the end of
25 Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954).
2 See supra section IV. B.
... OHIo R. Civ. P. 12(D) applies only to "[t]he defenses specifically enumerated (1) to (7)
in subdivision (B)" of Civil Rule 12. Failure of commencement is not one of those defenses.
254 See Sizemore v. Smith, 6 Ohio St. 3d 330, 335-36, 453 N.E.2d 632, 637-38 (1983)(C.
Brown, J., dissenting).
2. First Bank of Marietta v. Cline, 12 Ohio St. 3d 317, 466 N.E.2d 567 (1983).
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that year. 258 Of course, if the plaintiff abandons his attempt to get valid
service after the initial service is quashed, such abandonment will warrant
a dismissal under Civil Rule 4(E). If the action is dismissed under that
Rule, the dismissal will commence the action and will defeat the defense
of failure of commencement. Thus, the need to wait out the year to deter-
mine the "availability" of the failure of commencement defense will, for
all practical purposes, defeat the assertion of that defense by motion
prior to the expiration of the year; but for the reasons stated above, it will
not prevent the assertion of that defense in the responsive pleading.
As a rule of thumb, then, in all three situations in which failure of com-
mencement arises out of lack of jurisdiction over the person, the defense
of failure of commencement can be asserted in the responsive pleading
served within the time prescribed or within the time as extended for the
service of the responsive pleading. However, in the second and third situ-
ations (no service or defective service), the defense of failure of com-
mencement normally cannot be asserted by motion until after the expira-
tion of the year following the filing of the complaint.
E. How May the Defense Be Asserted
1. Before Judgment
a. Motion to Strike the Complaint from the Files
Civil Rule 7(B)(1) stipulates that a motion must "set forth the relief or
order sought," but the only relief which can be granted in a failure of
commencement situation is the striking of the complaint from the files
for failure of commencement.25 7 Therefore, if the defense of failure of
commencement is available for assertion by motion,5 8 the motion to be
used for this purpose is a motion to strike the complaint from the files for
failure of commencement and not a motion to dismiss.259 Indeed, if a mo-
ll' Browne, supra note 98, at 479-82.
. Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 384, 119 N.E.2d 285, 288 (1954).
15' As a rule of thumb, a defense is available for assertion by motion if it will be ripe for
adjudication within thirty to ninety days after the motion is made. See Browne, supra note
98, at 453-54 nn.49-50.
15' Saunders v. Choi, No. 45101, slip op. at 7 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 5,
1983)(Cuyahoga County), aff'd on other grounds, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984).
If the movant is in the presence of the court during a hearing or trial, the motion can be
made orally; otherwise, it must be made in writing. Omo R. Civ. P. 7(B)(1). Cf. First Bank
of Marietta v. Cline, 12 Ohio St. 3d 317, 318, 466 N.E.2d 567, 569 (1984)(defense properly
raised by written motion was not waived by failure to request a pretrial hearing on the
motion). The written motion to strike may be supported or opposed by documentary evi-
dence in testimonial form, since its resolution will often require the proof of facts not appar-
ent in the record. Cf. Grossi v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 4 Ohio App. 3d 51, 54, 446 N.E.2d
473, 476 (7th Dist. 1980)(Jefferson County)(court can consider affidavits setting forth juris-
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tion to dismiss is used to challenge failure of commencement, it could
well be argued that the motion waives the defense of failure of com-
mencement, since it asks for a form of relief that is consistent with an
action that has been commenced but inconsistent with an action that has
not been commenced.
If the failure of commencement appears from the record at the time the
complaint is filed or shortly thereafter, may the defense be raised by a
motion to strike made prior to the service of the responsive pleading? A
literal reading of Civil Rule 12(B) would require a negative answer, since
that Rule allows only those defenses listed therein to be raised by pre-
answer motion. Traditionally, however, courts have permitted a pleader
to raise any defense by pre-answer motion if the motion is made in good
faith, and if the defense would likely abate the suit or avoid recovery on
the claim if granted. This traditional practice is consistent with the man-
date of Civil Rule 1(B), and it has been used in failure of commencement
situations. 6
If the defense of failure of commencement was asserted in the answer
as an anticipated defense, may the motion to strike be made at the trial
on the merits? Clearly it can if the defense is then "available." Defenses
asserted in the answer are generally adjudicated at the trial, and the mo-
tion to strike would be an appropriate vehicle for obtaining that
adjudication. 16'
Given the same situation, can the motion to strike be made at some
time after the service of the answer but prior to the time of trial? The
Civil Rules do not directly address this question, except to the extent
that they provide for a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion
for summary judgment, but neither of those motions would be an appro-
priate vehicle for raising failure of commencement. 62 Nevertheless, if the
motion to strike is made after the defense of failure of commencement
becomes "available," the answer is probably in the affirmative since such
a motion would dispose of the action, and this type of pre-trial disposi-
tion is consistent with the principles of economy and expedition espoused
in Civil Rule 1(B).
If the defense was not asserted in the answer as an anticipated defense,
dictional facts when deciding a motion to dismiss based upon lack of in personam jurisdic-
tion); Jurko v. Jobs Europe Agency, 43 Ohio App. 2d 79, 85, 334 N.E.2d 478, 482 (8th Dist.
1975)(Cuyahoga County) (in considering motion to dismiss based upon lack of personal juris-
diction over the defendant, court could use oral and written evidence); Melamed v. Cata-
lano, 20 Ohio Op. 3d 428, 432 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1981)(documentary evidence in testimo-
nial form could be submitted in support of a motion to transfer based on improper venue).
See Saunders, slip op. at 3, 7.
261 See by analogy First Bank of Marietta, 12 Ohio St. 3d at 318, 466 N.E.2d at 569,
holding that defense of insufficiency of service raised in answer was properly adjudicated at
trial.
262 See supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
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may it be asserted by a post-answer motion to strike after it becomes
available as a defense? Again, premised on the principles of economy and
expedition which underlie Rule 1(B), the answer is probably in the af-
firmative. However, in this situation, it might be wiser first to bring the
defense within the pleadings by means of a supplemental answer made
under the provisions of Civil Rule 15(E), and then move to strike the
complaint from the files.
b. The Responsive Pleading
In pertinent part, Civil Rule 12(B) provides that every defense shall be
asserted in the responsive pleading if one is required, and Civil Rule 8(C)
states that in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively any matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense.
The defense of failure of commencement is either an affirmative defense
in its own right,2"3 or so close to it as to be a quasi-affirmative defense
similar to those defenses enumerated in Civil Rule 12(B).2"4 Therefore, if
the defense is "available" at the time the answer is served, and if it was
not raised by a pre-answer motion to strike the complaint from the files,
the defense must be asserted affirmatively in the answer, or it will be
waived. 6 5 This waiver, of course, may be overcome by the various forms
of amendment, 266 but if it is not it stands, and the action is deemed com-
menced by default.
If the defense of failure of commencement is not "available" at the
time the responsive pleading must be served, it need not be asserted in
that responsive pleading; in such case, after it becomes "available" as a
defense, it should be brought into the pleadings by way of a supplemental
responsive pleading.267 However, while the pleader need not include the
unavailable defense of failure of commencement in his responsive plead-
ing, he may do so, if he so desires, on the legitimate assumption that the
defense will mature before trial.
2 68
The actual assertion of the defense in the responsive pleading is rela-
tively simple. However, care must be taken to include the Rules' defense
which underlies the failure of commencement defense; if the Rules' de-
fense is waived through omission, the failure of commencement defense
will also be waived. Accordingly, a convenient pleading device is the pair-
ing of the two defenses. Suppose, for example, that failure of commence-
263 Scigliano, supra note 5, at 290.
2.4 Browne, supra note 95, at 361-66.
246 Hoover v. Sumlin, 12 Ohio St. 3d 1, 3-4, 465 N.E.2d 377, 379-80 (1984).
266 See id.; Browne, The New Civil Rule 12(H), 54 CLEV. B.J. 222 (1983); Browne, supra
note 95, at 361-66.
"I Riley v. City of Cincinnati, 46 Ohio St. 2d 287, 348 N.E.2d 135 (1984); Browne, supra
note 95, at 450-51.
2.. See supra section V. D.
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ment arises out of a failure to serve the defendant with a summons. The
Civil Rule 12(B)(2) defense and the failure of commencement defense
might be paired as follows:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
6. For her first affirmative defense defendant states that this
Court lacks jurisdiction over her person.
7. For her second affirmative defense defendant states that this
action has not been commenced against her.
In some cases, more than a simple pairing might be required. If failure
of commencement arises out of invalid service, as opposed to no service at
all, the case for failure of commencement would have to be built as
follows:
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
12. For his first affirmative defense, defendant says that the ser-
vice of summons upon him was insufficient.
13. For his second affirmative defense, defendant says that this
Court lacks jurisdiction over his person.
14. For his third affirmative defense, defendant says that this
action has not been commenced against him.
In this situation, insufficiency of service is the predicate for lack of juris-
diction, and lack of jurisdiction is the predicate for failure of commence-
ment. All three defenses must be pleaded in order to avoid a waiver.
2. After Judgment
a. An Appeal
If the defender has appeared in the action, raised the defense of failure
of commencement, and had it rejected by the court, the proper remedy is
an appeal from that decision. Indeed, if the defender does not appeal, the
trial court's decision on the question of commencement becomes res judi-
cata and bars any collateral attack on the judgment."'
What if the defender has not appeared in the action?2 70 In that case he
"I Cf. State ex rel. Witsamen v. Maumee Valley Guidance Center, 6 Ohio St. 3d 26, 400
N.E.2d 1180 (1983)(failure to appeal on issue of subject matter jurisdiction); City of Toledo
v. Custer, 24 Ohio St. 2d 152, 256 N.E.2d 284 (1970)(failure to appeal decision in appropria-
tion proceeding); Aetna Life & Casualty v. Daugherty, No. 45368 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App.
Apr. 21, 1983)(Cuyahoga County)(failure to appeal assumption of subject matter jurisdic-
tion); Hughes v. Cz, No. 39148 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. July 19, 1979)(Cuyahoga
County)(same).
7' If the defendant has never been served with a summons he need not appear in the
action even if he is aware of it. The Ohio Supreme Court in Maryhew v. Yova, 11 Ohio St.
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may appeal and raise the question of failure of commencement for the
first time on appeal, if the following conditions are met: 1) he learned of
the judgment in time to take an appeal, and 2) the record made in the
trial court will sustain the defense. If both of these conditions are met, a
motion to vacate will not lie because it cannot be used as a substitute for
an appeal.2 71 Whether the opportunity to take an appeal in cases such as
this would estop the defender from collaterally attacking the judgment in
another proceeding has yet to be determined. In any event, if an appeal is
taken, the assignment of error on appeal will be to the effect that the
judgment is void for failure of commencement.
b. The Motion to Vacate a Void Judgment
The only judgment that may be entered in an action that has failed of
commencement is an order striking the complaint from the files. The
nonexistence of the action that has failed of commencement will not sus-
tain any other judgment, and any other judgment would thus be void and
a nullity. 7 ' Moreover, Civil Rule 60(B) does not apply to void judg-
ments;2 "1 therefore, a Rule 60(B) motion for relief from judgment cannot
be used to challenge the entry of a void judgment in an action that has
failed of commencement. Accordingly, if the defendant has not appeared
in the action, and if he does not learn of the judgment in time to take an
appeal or if the record made in the trial court will not, on its face, sustain
the defense of failure of commencement, the defendant may raise that
defense for the first time by the common law motion to vacate a void
judgmentY7 4
If only the parties to the judgment are affected by it, a void judgment
may be vacated at any time. 5 Further, unlike the vacation of a voidable
3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984), said:
No action having been commenced, there was no obligation upon this defendant
under the Civil Rules to move or otherwise plead within the year and her failure
to do so would not have waived her right to the affirmative defense of lack of
personal jurisdiction. Inaction upon the part of a defendant who is not served with
process, even though he might be aware of the filing of the action, does not dis-
pense with the necessity of service. Haley v. Hanna (1915), 93 Ohio St. 49, 112
N.E. 149. The Civil Rules do not change this common law of Ohio.
Id. at 157, 464 N.E.2d at 541.
271 E.g., Blasco v. Mislik, 69 Ohio St. 2d 684 (1982); Steadly v. Montanya, 67 Ohio St. 2d
297, 423 N.E.2d 1082 (1981); Colley v. Bazell, 64 Ohio St. 2d 243, 416 N.E.2d 605 (1980).
272 Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954).
... See GMS Management Co. v. Axe, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1982); OHIO
R. Civ. P. 60(B) advisory committee note (1970).
27, GMS Management, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d at 4 (citing with approval Pinkus v. Pinkus, No.
43776 (Ohio 8th Dist, Ct. App. Apr. 15, 1982)(Cuyahoga County)).
116 Lincoln Tavern v. Snader, 165 Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956); Santiago v. S.S.
Kresge Co., 2 Ohio Op. 3d 54 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976); In re Sergent, 49 Ohio Misc. 36
(C.P. Montgomery County 1976).
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judgment, which may require further proceedings in the trial court, the
vacation of a void judgment completely terminates the litigation. There-
fore, to prevail on a motion to vacate a void judgment it is not necessary
for the movant to demonstrate that he has a meritorious defense to pre-
sent if it is vacated, nor is it necessary that the motion be made within a
reasonable time after the entry of the void judgment.276 Thus, the motion
to vacate a void judgment has significant advantages over the Civil Rule
60(B) motion for relief from a voidable judgment.
c. Other Post-Judgment Remedies
As noted in the preceding section, a judgment entered in an action that
has not been commenced, other than a judgment striking the complaint
from the files, is void and a nullity. Accordingly, if the defendant has not
made an appearance in the action, if he has not had an opportunity to
appeal the void judgment, and if he has not moved to vacate it,2 77 he may
raise the issue of failure of commencement by any of the post-judgment
remedies provided for the challenge of void judgments. 278 Thus, he could
bring an action to have the judgment declared void, or an action to enjoin
its enforcement, or he could attack it collaterally if it is made the subject
of another action.
2 79
VI. SUSTAINING THE CHALLENGE: THE APPROPRIATE JUDGMENT
Almost every court that has found the challenge to commencement well
taken has dismissed the action for failure of commencement. Yet, as Kos-
suth v. Bear280 made absolutely clear, an action that has failed of com-
mencement cannot be dismissed because it is nonexistent; the only cor-
rect disposition of the action is to strike the complaint from the files. The
Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County stated in Saunders v. Choi:281
When an action fails of commencement it is as if no complaint
was ever filed. If service is obtained anytime within one year of
the filing of the complaint, the action is considered commenced as
Peoples Banking Co. v. Brumfield Hay & Grain Co., 172 Ohio St. 545, 179 N.E.2d 53
(1961); Lincoln Tavern v. Snader, 165 Ohio St. 61, 133 N.E.2d 606 (1956); Hayes v. Ken-
tucky Joint Land Bank of Lexington, 125 Ohio St. 359, 181 N.E. 542 (1932); Kingsborough
v. Tousley, 56 Ohio St. 450, 47 N.E. 541 (1897); Watts v. Brown, No. 45638 (Ohio 8th Dist.
Ct. App. Aug. 4, 1983)(Cuyahoga County).
277 If the defendant moves to vacate the void judgment, and the trial court finds against
him, he is bound by that finding unless it is reversed on appeal. Claxton v. Simons, 174 Ohio
St. 333, 189 N.E.2d 62 (1963).
... OHIo R. Civ. P. 60(B) advisory committee note (1970).
... Id. See Santiago v. S.S. Kresge Co., 2 Ohio Op. 3d 54 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976).
280 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954). See the material quoted at supra note 1.
"' No. 45101 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), aff'd, 12 Ohio St.
3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984).
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of the date of filing. When service is not obtained within one year
of filing the complaint, however, no case exists; there is nothing
pending before the court and the action fails. Kossuth v. Bear
(1954), 161 Ohio St. 378; Mason v. Waters (1966), 6 Ohio St.2d
212; Lash v. Miller (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 63.
Therefore, the proper action of the trial court would have been
to strike the complaint from the record for failure of commence-
ment. As stated by the Ohio Supreme Court in Kossuth, supra, at
384:
"It seems axiomatic that a nonexistent case can not be dis-
missed. In the present instance, for lack of service, no case came
into existence ....
The trial court could have taken such action sua sponte ....
Striking a complaint for failure of service is an appropriate action
to clear a court's docket. The entry "dismissing" the complaint in
this case should be read as an order "striking" the complaint.282
Therefore, the appropriate judgment in failure of commencement situa-
tions is an order striking the complaint from the files.
At this point Civil Rule 3(A)'s linkage between commencement and in
personam jurisdiction presents a difficulty. Suppose that in a single com-
plaint plaintiff Lash asserts claims against defendants Miller and Astley.
Miller is served within the year following the filing of the complaint, but
Astley is not. As a consequence, the action has been commenced against
Miller but not against Astley. 21 Therefore, if Astley timely and properly
asserts the defense of failure of commencement, the court cannot dismiss
282 Id. slip op. at 7. The Ohio Supreme Court in its affirmance of the appellate decision
noted:
The court of appeals ruled that plaintiff's failure to obtain service of process
within one year of refiling her complaint previously dismissed without prejudice
should cause the complaint to be stricken from the record (case No. 45101).
Under Civ. R. 3(A), an action is not deemed to be "commenced" unless service
of process is obtained within one year from the date of the filing of the action.
The record before us reveals that service of process over the appellee was not
obtained until approximately two years had elapsed from the date of filing, and
this presumes that the method of service of process undertaken was indeed valid.
In any event, since service of process was not obtained within the time con-
straints set forth in Civ. R. 3(A), appellant's action was therefore not timely com-
menced either under the Civil Rules or R.C. 2305.19 . . Since appellant failed
to obtain service of process within the time period allotted in Civ. R. 3(A), under
the procedural devices governing service of process set forth in Civ. R. 4 et. seq.,
appellant's action must fail.
• . . The judgement of the court of appeals in case No. 45101 is hereby
affirmed.
12 Ohio St. 3d at 248, 250-51, 466 N.E.2d at 891-93.
283 See Lash v. Miller, 50 Ohio St. 2d 63, 362 N.E.2d 642 (1977).
(Vol. 33:245
62https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss2/5
OHIO CIVIL RULES 3(A) AND 4(E)
the action as to Astley because an action against him never came into
existence, and it cannot strike the complaint from the files because the
action against Miller did come into existence. What judgment, then, can
the court enter in favor of Astley? In this situation, the proper judgment
is an order striking the claim against Astley from Lash's complaint. It
must be emphasized, however, that the order striking the claim against
Astley from Lash's pleading is not a Civil Rule 12(F) order striking an
insufficient claim from the pleading but a Civil Rule 3(A) order declaring
that no claim has ever been asserted against Astley because the action
against him has never come into existence.
Can the court strike the claim against Astley from the complaint, and
give Lash leave to assert a new claim against Astley by way of amend-
ment? If the statute of limitation applicable to the claim against Astley
has expired at the time the order is entered, the court can not grant leave
to assert a new claim by way of amendment, since the running of the
statute of limitations will bar the claim against Astley.' 8' If the statute of
limitations has not expired, however, leave to amend can be granted. To
avoid the almost inevitable confusion, the amendment process should be
a two-step process. First, Lash will serve and file an amended complaint
against Miller alone and with no reference to Astley. This will clearly es-
tablish that the initial action was commenced only against Miller. Second,
Lash will serve and file a second amended complaint which will be simi-
lar, if not identical, to the original complaint in that it asserts claims
against both Miller and Astley. Thereafter, if Lash obtains timely and
sufficient service on Astley, the action against Astley will be deemed com-
menced as of the date the second amended complaint was filed while the
action against Miller will be deemed commenced as of the date the origi-
nal complaint was filed.
Would Civil Rule 54(B) apply to an order striking the claim against
Astley from Lash's complaint? The answer is in the negative. Civil Rule
54(B) applies to an order which "adjudicates fewer than all the claims."
The order striking the claim against Astley does not "adjudicate" that
claim; it does not dispose of it either on the merits or other than upon the
merits. It is simply a declaration that the claim is not before the court for
adjudication since the action against Astley was never commenced.
Therefore, since the order striking the claim against Astley is not an or-
der "adjudicating" that claim, it does not fall within the ambit of Civil
Rule 54(B).
In any event, what the trial court cannot do-whether the action is a
unitary action against a single defendant or a multiple-party action
against two or more defendants-is dismiss the action or dismiss a claim
for failure of commencement. What if the court's journal entry sustaining
"' See Lash v. Astley, No. 79AP-477 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 1980)(Franklin
County).
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the challenge to commencement expressly states that the action or claim
is "dismissed"? If the trial court's journal entry clearly and unequivocally
states that the basis for the "dismissal" is failure of commencement, no
great harm will come to either party. In such case, the "dismissal" will be
seen as a clerical mistake or oversight, and the journal entry will be read
as if it struck the complaint from the files or the claim from the plead-ings.285 However, in this situation the more prudent course would be a
correction of the journal entry so that it states the proper disposition of
the action or the claim.
What if the journal entry does not explain the basis for the dismissal?
In such case, a reviewing court will presume regularity in the proceedings
of the trial court. Therefore, since an action that has failed of commence-
ment cannot be dismissed, a reviewing court will presume that the action
was dismissed for a reason underlying failure of commence-
ment-nonexistence of a party, lack of capacity to sue or be sued, or fail-
ure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
If the statute of limitations has not run, no great harm will come to the
defendant from such an unexplained "dismissal." At the very best, such a
dismissal will be construed as a dismissal on the merits, and res judicata
will bar a subsequent action by the plaintiff. At the very worst, the dis-
missal will be construed as a dismissal other than upon the merits, and
the plaintiff will be allowed to bring a new action at any time before the
statute of limitations expires. Since the plaintiff could bring such a new
action if the journal entry had been properly drafted to reflect failure of
commencement as the basis for striking the complaint from the files or
for striking the claim from the pleadings, the effect on the defendant will
be the same, and the clerical mistake or oversight in the journal entry is
of no consequence.
Nor will the plaintiff be harmed if the journal entry reads "dismissed
without prejudice," or "dismissed otherwise than upon the merits,"2 8 or
if the dismissal is unqualified, and the only possible ground for failure of
commencement is lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.2 87
In all of these situations, the dismissal will be other than upon the merits,
and the plaintiff will be free to bring a new action before the statute of
limitations runs. However, the plaintiff runs the risk of irretrievable
harm if the dismissal in the journal entry is an unqualified dismissal, and
the underlying basis for failure of commencement is either nonexistence
of a party or lack of capacity to sue or be sued. In such case, the dismissal
could be construed as a dismissal for nonexistence or lack of capacity, and
"I Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954); Saunders v. Choi, No. 45101
(Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), a/i'd, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466
N.E.2d 889 (1984).
. See OHIo R. Civ. P. 41(B)(3).
211 See OHio R. Civ. P. 41(B)(4).
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an unqualified dismissal for either of these reasons would operate as an
adjudication upon the merits."' Res judicata would then bar any new ac-
tion by the plaintiff even if the statute of limitations had not run. There-
fore, if the statute of limitations has not run, it is imperative that the
plaintiff see that a journal entry "dismissing" the action or the claim be
corrected to a journal entry that strikes the complaint or claim from the
files for failure of commencement; otherwise, the plaintiff may forfeit his
right to bring a new action before the statute of limitations expires.
On the other hand, if the statute of limitations has expired at the time
the judgment is entered, it is the defendant who is placed in jeopardy by
the unexplained "dismissal." If that dismissal could be construed as a dis-
missal other than upon the merits for one of the reasons underlying fail-
ure of commencement, the plaintiff could bring a new action against the
defendant at any time within one year from the date of dismissal under
section 2305.19, the "savings statute."289 The plaintiff could not do this if
the journal entry made it explicit that the complaint was being stricken
from the files for failure of commencement. 290 Thus, if the defendant
wants to prevent a second suit by the plaintiff, it will be incumbent upon
him to have the journal entry corrected. This may not be easy to do; be-
cause failure of commencement is the "forgotten defense," it is not much
used, and as a consequence, few trial judges have had any occasion to deal
with its peculiarities. Thus, there may be some difficulty in convincing
the trial judge that there is a significant difference between "dismissing"
the action and "striking the complaint from the files."291
Another difficulty is choosing the appropriate vehicle for obtaining the
correction. If the action had been commenced in a federal district court,
one would have access to a motion to alter or amend the judgment.59
Unfortunately, the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure have no counterpart to
that very convenient and useful device, and the state court litigant will
" See OHIo R. Civ. P. 41(B)(3).
"8 See supra note 168.
z1O See infra text accompanying notes 313-15.
See, e.g., Saunders v. Choi, No. 45101 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga
County), aff'd, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984). The trial judge in Saunders noted
that "this case at this time does not legitimately stand on the Court's docket for it has never
been commenced." Id. slip op. at 4. Thus, the trial judge was aware of the fact that failure
of commencement was the basis for his action. Nevertheless, in the journal entry, he "dis-
missed" the action without prejudice. The defendant was forced to take a cross-appeal in
order to have this journal entry corrected. Id. Fortunately, the court of appeals did recog-
nize the distinction between a "dismissal" and the "striking of the complaint from the
files," and found that: "The entry "dismissing" the complaint in this case should be read as
an order "striking" the complaint .... The decisions below are affirmed, with the caveat
that the dismissal in case No. 45101 is to be read as striking the complaint from the record."
Id. at 7, 9. As indicated in supra note 282, the supreme court expressly affirmed this dispo-
sition by the court of appeals.
.2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e).
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have to employ more cumbersome tools.
If, as in Saunders v. Choi,29 it is clear from the record that the trial
judge intended to dispose of the action or the claim on the basis of failure
of commencement, one might use a Civil Rule 60(A) motion to correct the
judgment." 4 This motion would argue that the use of the word "dis-
missed" in the journal entry was a "clerical error" or an "oversight," since
the court clearly intended to strike the complaint from the files or to
strike the claim from the pleading.2" This is, however, a very murky area
of the law, and the precise scope of Rule 60(A) is uncertain. If, for exam-
ple, the trial court intended to dispose of the action on the basis of failure
of commencement, but it also intended to dismiss the action because it
believed that dismissal was the proper method to be used in achieving its
goal, it cannot be said that the use of the term "dismissed" was either
"clerical error" or "oversight."2 96 In such case, use of the term "dis-
missed" would be substantive error, not merely formal error, and sub-
stantive error is not within the ambit of Civil Rule 60(A).197 Therefore,
since it is seldom clear from the record whether the trial court used the
23 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 248, 466 N.E.2d 889, 891 (1984). See supra note 291.
... O-ito R. Civ. P. 60(A) states:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any
time on its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be
so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
The syllabus in Torres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 68 Ohio App. 2d 87, 427 N.E.2d 32 (8th
Dist. 1980)(Cuyahoga County), reflects the general limitations on the use of a Civil Rule
60(A) motion to correct a judgment:
1. A court of record speaks only through its journal; it may, when the journal fails
to reflect its actions accurately, correct the journal by an order nunc pro tunc, i.e.,
an order entered "now for then" and effective on the date the action was actually
taken.
2. Orders nunc pro tunc are available to make the court's record speak the truth;
they must be premised upon orders the court has actually made, but has not re-
corded or has incorrectly recorded. They are unavailable to make the record re-
flect orders the court should have made or intended to make, but did not.
Id. at 87, 427 N.E.2d at 33.
"I See, by analogy, Maryland v. Baltimore Transit Co., 38 F.R.D. 340, 343-44 (D. Md.
1965), in which the court changed an entry dismissing a claim "with prejudice" to one dis-
missing it "without prejudice" because that had been its original intent. See also the cases
discussed in § 5 of Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 794 (1972).
"I See Cale Prods., Inc. v. Orrville Bronze & Aluminum Co., 8 Ohio App. 3d 375, 457
N.E.2d 854 (9th Dist. 1982)(Wayne County); Akron Insulating Co. v. Cunningham, No.
10548 (Ohio 9th Dist. Ct. App. June 30, 1982)(Summit County); Annot., 13 A.L.R. FED. 794,
812-15 (1972).
'17 As it is said in Musca v. Village of Chagrin Falls, 3 Ohio App. 3d 192, 192, 444 N.E.2d
475, 476 (8th Dist. 1981)(Cuyahoga County)(syllabus I): "Civ. R. 60(A) authorizes the cor-
rection of clerical mistakes only. Substantive changes in orders, judgments or decrees are
not within its purview."
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word "dismissed" with intent or whether it used it inadvertently because
it was unaware of the proper order to be entered, the party employing the
Rule 60(A) motion to correct the record should be careful to preserve his
right to appeal from the "dismissal." In this connection, it should be
noted that the 60(A) motion to correct the judgment may be made after
the filing of the notice of appeal.""
If the defense of failure of commencement was raised in the answer and
determined by the court at the time of trial, then it may be said that it
was an issue of law that was tried by the court.299 That being so, the
correctness of a journal entry "dismissing" the action can be tested by a
motion for new trial premised on the ground that the judgment is con-
trary to law. 30 0 Due to the terminology involved, the use of a motion for
new trial for this purpose is cumbersome; the party making such a motion
is not asking for relitigation of the defense of failure of commencement
but is simply asking for a change in the judgment entry. This can be ac-
complished under that provision of Civil Rule 59(A) which states that
"[oln a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment ... and enter a new judgment." On the other
hand, if the defense of failure of commencement was raised by pre-answer
motion, a motion for new trial under the same provision will not lie; a
motion is heard, not tried,0 1 and a "new" trial cannot be granted unless
' See supra note 294. After the appeal has been docketed, however, the trial court can
act on the motion to correct only with leave of the appellate court. Meyer v. Board of Educ.,
No. 45065 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 1983)(Cuyahoga County).
... Oujo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2311.01, -.02, .04 (Page 1981).
00 OHIo R. Civ. P. 59(A)(7).
"I' L.A. & D., Inc. v. Board of Lake County Comm'rs, 67 Ohio St. 2d 384, 423 N.E.2d 1109
(1981); Trustees v. McClannahan, 53 Ohio St. 403, 42 N.E. 34 (1895); Railway Co. v. Thur-
stin, 44 Ohio St. 525, 9 N.E. 232 (1886); Note, The Meaning of the Term "Trial" Within
the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 CLEV. ST. L. Rav. 515 (1976).
In Brown v. Coffman, 13 Ohio App. 3d 168, 468 N.E.2d 790 (2d Dist. 1983), the Court of
Appeals for Montgomery County stated:
R.C. 2311.01 defines trial as "***a judicial examination of the issues, whether of
law or of fact, in an action or proceeding." . . . An "issue" is defined by the Re-
vised Code as an averment arising from the "pleadings" of one of the parties and
controverted by the other. R.C. 2311.02. "Pleadings" is defined by Civ. R. 7(A) to
include the complaint, answer, cross-claims, counterclaims, third party claims, and
their corresponding replies. Since a trial must necessarily involve the examination
of issues, and since issues may only be raised in the pleadings, it follows that a
trial must be initiated by one or more of the pleadings. See Carroll, the Meaning
of the Term "Trial" within the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure (1976), 25 Cleve.St.
L.Rev. 515.
A hearing, on the other hand, is initiated by a motion to the court. Civ. R. 7(B)
governs the making of motions. When a motion is made, the judge may either
dispose of it immediately or schedule it for a hearing. R.C. 2311.09. A pleading,
while filed with the court, is directed primarily to the opposing party for the pur-
pose of making or responding to a particular allegation. It is apparent, both by
definition and by separate treatment in the rules, that the drafters of the Ohio
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there has been an "old" trial. 2 If the motion for a new trial would not
lie, the making of such a motion does not suspend the time for taking an
appeal.30 3 Accordingly, if one is not careful in the use of this vehicle for
obtaining a correction of the judgment entry, one may lose the right to
appeal from the "dismissal." This anomaly again points out the need for
an Ohio equivalent of the motion to alter or amend a judgment found in
Federal Rule 59(e).
If correction of the journal entry would require the consideration of
matters outside the record, an appeal would probably not be possible.
Therefore, the party seeking the correction could use a Civil Rule
60(B)(1) motion for relief from judgment premised on "mistake" or "in-
advertence,"' 4 or a 60(B)(5) motion premised on "any other reason justi-
fying relief"3 5 for the dual purpose of obtaining the correction and estab-
lishing the necessary record if a subsequent appeal becomes necessary. If
the record is adequate to support the correction, so that no inquiry
outside the record need be made, an appeal from the "dismissal" would
be feasible, and a Rule 60(B) motion on any ground ought not be availa-
ble. This area of post-judgment relief is, however, a gray one; although
the Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a Civil Rule 60(B) mo-
Civil Rules intended pleadings and motions to be distinct types of documents.
Thus, it would seem that a trial could be distinguished from a hearing by merely
looking to the method by which the particular proceeding was commenced. Car-
roll, supra, at 518.
An examination of the grounds for a new trial under Civ. R. 59(A) suggests that
the drafters of the rule contemplated the term "trial" in its conventional sense,
that is, an adversary proceeding, including pleadings, opening statements, presen-
tation of evidence, closing arguments, and submission to the court or jury for final
determination. See, also, R.C. 2315.01.
Id. at 169-70, 468 N.E.2d at 791..
"' State ex rel. Batten v. Reece, 70 Ohio St. 2d 246, 436 N.E.2d 1027 (1982); L.A. & D.,
Inc. v. Board of Lake County Comm'rs, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 387, 423 N.E.2d at 1111; Rush v.
City of North Olmsted, No. 42806 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 7, 1981)(Cuyahoga County).
505 L.A. & D., Inc. v. Board of Lake County Comm'rs, 67 Ohio St. 2d at 387, 423 N.E.2d at
1111; Shearson, Hayden & Stone v. Steiner, 66 Ohio App. 2d 10, 418 N.E.2d 1389 (2d Dist.
1979)(Montgomery County).
301 See Annot., 1 A.L.R. FED. 771 (1969).
305 As it is said in State ex rel. Gyurcsik v. Angelotta, 50 Ohio St. 2d 345, 364 N.E.2d 284
(1977): "It is generally held that court errors and omissions are reasons justifying relief
under the 'other reason' clause. (See 15 A.L.R. Fed. 243-249, Section 12.)" Id. at 347, 364
N.E.2d at 285. One of the "errors and omissions" complained of in this case was the trial
court's dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute without giving plaintiff's counsel that
notice required by Civil Rule 41(B)(1). Id. This absence of notice would have been demon-
strated in the record so that an appeal could have been taken in this case had plaintiffs
learned of the dismissal in time to take that appeal.
See also Buckman v. Goldblatt, 39 Ohio App. 2d 1, 314 N.E.2d 188 (8th Dist.
1974)(Cuyahoga County), where the court said: "An application of the applicable law to the
facts in this case leads to the conclusion that the levy and foreclosure were contrary to law.
This impropriety results in a condition for the appellants that the catch-all provisions of
Civ. Rule 60(B)(5) was patterned to correct." Id. at 6, 314 N.E.2d at 190.
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tion cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal," 6 it has not always
followed its own rule."'7 Due to this saying-one-thing-and-doing-another
behavior by the supreme court and other courts, 08 it is difficult to know
with any degree of certainty whether a motion for relief from judgment
would lie if an appeal could be taken from the entry of dismissal. It
should be noted, though, that when a Rule 60(B) motion has been used in
these circumstances outside of Ohio, it has generally been held that the
motion is not made within a reasonable time unless it is made before the
expiration of the time for filing the notice of appeal.3 9 In any event, since
the 60(B) route is fraught with uncertainty, the party choosing to follow
it should take all steps necessary to protect his right to appeal from the
entry of "dismissal.
3 10
Finally, if the record adequately supports the need for correction, the
aggrieved party can have the court of appeals make the correction by tak-
ing a timely appeal from the judgment, or a timely cross-appeal if the
adverse party appeals. This latter method was the vehicle for correction
employed by the prevailing defendant in Saunders v. Choi."'1 While it is
somewhat anomalous for a judgment winner to take an appeal from the
judgment in his favor, he may do so if he can demonstrate prejudice to
him by the judgment. 2 As noted above, an unexplained "dismissal" has
the capacity for causing considerable mischief for either party. If the stat-
ute of limitations has not run, it may deprive the unsuccessful plaintiff of
his right to bring a new action before the statute expires; if the statute of
limitations has run, it may deny the successful defendant the repose to
.. Blasco v. Mislik, 69 Ohio St. 2d 684 (1982); Steadly v. Montanya, 67 Ohio St. 2d 297,
423 N.E.2d 851 (1981); Colley v. Bazell, 64 Ohio St. 2d 243, 416 N.E.2d 605 (1980).
... In addition to State ex rel. Gyurcsik v. Angelotta, 50 Obio St. 2d 345, 364 N.E.2d 284
(1977), see Svoboda v. Brunswick, 6 Ohio St. 3d 348, 453 N.E.2d 648 (1983).
"' Compare Buckman v. Goldblatt, 39 Ohio App. 2d 1, 314 N.E.2d 188 (8th Dist.
1974)(Cuyahoga County)(applying Rule 60(B)(5) on grounds that judgment was "contrary
to law") with Haendiges v. Widenmeyer Elec. Constr. Co., 9 Ohio App. 3d 37, 457 N.E.2d
854 (9th Dist. 1983)(Medina County)(refusing to apply Rule 60 when appellant failed to
satisfy procedural requirements of Rule).
30. See Cale Prods., Inc. v. Orrville Bronze & Aluminum Co., 8 Ohio App. 3d 375, 379 n.2,
457 N.E.2d 854, 858 n.2 (9th Dist. 1982)(Wayne County); Annot., 1 A.L.R. FED. 771 (1969).
... For suitable protective procedures, see Majnaric v. Majnaric, 46 Ohio App. 2d 157, 347
N.E.2d 552 (9th Dist. 1975)(Summit County).
3, No. 45101 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. May 5, 1983)(Cuyahoga County), aff'd, 12 Ohio St.
3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984). Defendant cross-appellant's second assignment of error is set
forth as follows:
Where plaintiff's complaint was filed on August 30, 1979 and plaintiff failed to
obtain service upon the defendant within the one-year period prescribed in Rule
3(A) of the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure and defendant has moved for an order
striking the complaint, based upon the failure of plaintiff to comply with Ohio
Civil Rule 3(A), the trial court erred in dismissing the action without prejudice.
Id. slip op. at 6.
.. Devlin Enters., Inc. v. Holmes, No. 79 CA 39 (Ohio 7th Dist. Ct. App. June 26,
1979)(Mahoning County).
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which he is entitled by allowing the plaintiff to bring a new action under
the provisions of section 2305.19. Thus, prejudice is inherent in such a
journal entry, and an appeal by the prevailing party would lie. Of course,
if the original record made in the trial court would not support an assign-
ment of error asking for a correction in the journal entry "dismissing" the
case, the aggrieved party may first have to create a record for appeal by
using a Rule 59(A)(7) motion for a new trial, a Rule 60(A) motion to cor-
rect the record, or a Rule 60(B)(1) or 60(B)(5) motion for relief from
judgment as appropriate.
In sum, an action or claim cannot be dismissed for failure of com-
mencement; the proper judgment is an order striking the complaint from
the files or the claim from the pleading. A journal entry "dismissing" the
action or claim may come back to haunt either party at a later date;
therefore, when a court enters such an order rather than an order striking
the complaint or the claim, the party likely to be prejudiced by the "dis-
missal" should take immediate steps to have the journal entry corrected.
How this is to be done will depend upon the circumstances outlined
above, and for want of a motion to alter or amend the judgment, it is
bound to be a somewhat cumbersome process.
VII. THE CONSEQUENCE OF FAILURE TO COMMENCE
Courts do not fully understand the difference between an action com-
menced, an action attempted to be commenced, and an action that has
failed of commencement; therefore, they often use the wrong language to
describe the consequence of failing to commence an action. As noted in
the previous section, they often "dismiss" an action that has failed of
commencement even though the dismissal of such an action is impossible.
Likewise, it is frequently said that when an action fails of commence-
ment, the complaint does not exist."' This, too, is wrong; the complaint
exists, but the action in which it was filed does not.314 This improper use
of language inevitably leads to confusion as to what may or may not be
... See, e.g., Barnhart v. Schultz, 53 Ohio St. 2d 59, 213 N.E.2d 168 (1978); Levering v.
Riverside Methodist Hosp., 2 Ohio App. 3d 157, 441 N.E.2d 290 (10th Dist. 1981)(Franklin
County); Nissen v. Callahan, No. 38132 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 1979)(Cuyahoga
County); Group of Tenants v. Mar-Len Realty, Inc., 40 Ohio App. 2d 449, 321 N.E.2d 241
(3d Dist. 1941)(Allen County).
31' In GMS Management Co. v. Axe, 5 Ohio Misc. 2d 1 (Clev. Hts. Mun. Ct. 1982), the
court said:
It is sometimes said in these cases that the complaint is a nullity, or that there is
no complaint. From what is said in Kossuth v. Bear (1954), 161 Ohio St. 378 [53
0.0. 280], however, it is apparent that the true doctrine is this: When the suit fails
for want of commencement, no action ever comes into existence, and there is
therefore no action to which the complaint can relate. As a consequence, the com-
plaint must be stricken from the court's files because of the nonexistence of the
action, and not because of the nonexistence of the complaint.
Id. at 4.
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done after a court has found that an action has failed of commencement.
The key to understanding the consequence of failure of commencement
is to understand that when a court finds that the action has failed of
commencement it in no way adjudicates the claim or claims presented in
that action. Its finding is limited to a declaration that the claim or claims
are not before it for adjudication because there is no action pending in
which they can be presented or in which it can exercise its jurisdiction.
Thus, the court's decision on the question of commencement is merits-
neutral; it is neither a finding "on the merits," nor a finding "otherwise
than upon the merits. 3 1 5 What consequence does such a merits-neutral
decision impose upon the parties to the action? The answer to this ques-
tion depends primarily upon the statute of limitations applicable to the
action.
A. If the Statute of Limitations Has Not Run
If the statute of limitations applicable to the action has not run at the
time the court strikes the complaint from the files, the answer to the
question posed above is a fairly simple one. Since the order striking the
complaint from the files is merits-neutral, it does not raise the bar of res
judicata. As a result, the same claim can be presented in a new action
between the same parties. Therefore, the party who failed to commence
the first action may bring a new action against the same defendant on the
same claim at any time prior to the running of the statute of limitations
applicable to that claim."' In short, having the original complaint strick-
en from the files for failure of commencement will be a hollow victory if
the plaintiff is alert to the possibilities of a new action.
It must be emphasized, however, that the new action must be brought
by filing the complaint before the statute of limitations expires, be it
years, days, or hours in which this must be done; section 2305.19 does not
apply and does not give the plaintiff a year in which to commence the
new action."1 7 Moreover, the court cannot extend the time for filing the
new action beyond the expiration date of the statute of limitations."
B. If the Statute of Limitations Has Run: The Savings Statute
If the statute of limitations applicable to the action has expired at the
time the court strikes the complaint from the files for failure of com-
See supra note 1.
, Lozier v. Thorne, No. 5-78-34 (Ohio 3d Dist. Ct. App. May 25, 1979)(Hancock
County).
"' Reese v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 6 Ohio St. 3d 162, 451 N.E.2d 1196 (1983); Murdock
v. Westbay Manor, No. 47209 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 1984)(Cuyahoga County);
Uhas v. New York Cent. R.R., 70 Ohio App. 464, 46 N.E.2d 677 (6th Dist. 1942)(Erie
County).
8 E.g., Murdock v. Westbay Manor, No. 47209, slip op. at 6.
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mencement, the running of the statute of limitations-if pleaded-will
bar a new action on the same claim against the same defendant unless
section 2305.19, the "savings statute," applies. In substance, the "savings
statute" provides that if an action commenced, or attempted to be com-
menced, fails otherwise than upon the merits after the statute of limita-
tions has expired, the plaintiff has one year from the date of failure in
which to commence a new action."'
There are three alternative reasons why the "savings statute" does not
apply: 1) that which fails after the statute of limitations has expired is
neither "an action commenced" nor "an action attempted to be com-
menced"; it is "an action that has failed of commencement"; 2) since no
action ever came into existence, there was nothing to "fail" otherwise
than upon the merits; or 3) if the action did fail, the failure was merits-
neutral and was not a failure "otherwise than upon the merits." Whatever
the virtue in any one of these reasons, it is now well settled that the "sav-
ings statute" does not apply if the complaint is stricken from the files or
the claim stricken from the pleading after the applicable statute of limi-
tations has run.
32 0
Does this mean that under these circumstances, a new action cannot be
brought on the same claim against the same defendant? As a general rule,
the answer is in the affirmative; the running of the statute of limitations
will bar the new action. 21 However, it must be remembered that the run-
ning of the statute of limitations is not an automatic bar to a new action;
to be an effective bar, the affirmative defense of the statute of limitations
must be timely and properly pleaded.32 2 Therefore, if the defendant
waives the statute of limitations defense by failing to interject it into the
new action, the new action can proceed since the termination of the first
action for failure of commencement does not raise any res judicata bar.
Finally, care must be taken to distinguish between the effect of a Rule
3(A) termination for failure of commencement and a Rule 4(E) termina-
tion for failure to obtain service within six months. While the former will
not be within the "savings statute" if it occurs after the statute of limita-
tions has expired, the latter will. That which is terminated under the pro-
3"' For the pertinent text of OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19 (Page 1981), see supra note
168.
320 Saunders v. Choi, 12 Ohio St. 3d 247, 466 N.E.2d 889 (1984); Maryhew v. Yova, 11
Ohio St. 3d 154, 464 N.E.2d 538 (1984); Mason v. Waters, 6 Ohio St. 2d 212, 217 N.E.2d 213
(1966); Hoehn v. Empire Steel Co., 172 Ohio St. 285, 175 N.E.2d 172 (1961), reo'd on other
grounds, Wasyk v. Trent, 174 Ohio St. 525, 191 N.E.2d 58 (1963); Kossuth v. Bear, 161 Ohio
St. 378, 119 N.E.2d 285 (1954); In re Johnson, No. 80AP-584 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Feb.
24, 1981)(Franklin County); DiCello v. Palmer, No. 79AP-402 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Feb.
12, 1981)(Franklin County); Lash v. Astley, No. 79AP-477 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 22,
1980)(Franklin County).
32 See cases cited supra note 320.
322 OHIo REv. ConE ANN. § 2305.03 (Page 1981), provides: "When interposed by proper
plea by a party to an action . . . lapse of time shall be a bar thereto." (emphasis added).
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visions of Rule 4(E) is "an action attempted to be commenced." '323 Fur-
ther, by the terms of the Rule, the termination is involuntary and
"without prejudice." Since an involuntary termination is a "failure, '324
and a termination "without prejudice" is "otherwise than upon the mer-
its,' ' 3 1 a Rule 4(E) termination which takes place after the statute of lim-
itations has expired is within the ambit of the "savings statute," and the
plaintiff has one year from such termination in which to bring a new
action. 6
VIII. APPELLATE REVIEW
A. The Defense Sustained
An order striking the complaint from the files for failure of commence-
ment has a three-fold effect: 1) it affects the plaintiffs substantial right
to proceed in that action; 2) it determines the action; and 3) it prevents a
judgment for the plaintiff in the action. Therefore, it is a final, appealable
order under the provisions of section 2505.02 and 2505.03. This will be
true even if the plaintiff could bring a new action before the statute of
limitations expires. For purposes of appeal, the focus is on the effect the
order has on the action in which it is entered and not the effect it may
have on some other action. Accordingly, if the party aggrieved by the or-
der wishes to challenge it on appeal, he must file his notice of appeal
within thirty days after the order is entered.2 7
Likewise, in a multi-claim, multi-party action, an order striking a claim
from the pleading: 1) affects the plaintiff's substantial right; 2) deter-
mines the action vis-a-vis the defendant against whom it was not com-
menced; and 3) prevents a judgment for plaintiff against that defendant.
Further, since the order does not in any way adjudicate the claim which it
strikes, Civil Rule 54(B) does not apply. Therefore, the order is a final,
appealable order whether or not it contains the magic phrase "no just
reason for delay.
328
It must be remembered, however, that the order striking the complaint
from the files, or the order striking the claim from the pleading, is merits-
neutral; that is, it is not a decision on the merits which would raise the
bar of res judicata. That introduces the problem posed by the Ohio Su-
323 Browne, supra note 5, at 168.
324 Siegfried v. Railroad Co., 50 Ohio St. 294, 296, 34 N.E. 331, 332 (1893).
... Chadwick v. Barba Lou, Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 222, 226 n.4, 431 N.E.2d 660, 663 n.4
(1980); Hensley v. Henry, 61 Ohio St. 2d 277, 279, 400 N.E.2d 1352, 1353-54 (1980); Nunes
v. Board of Trustees, No. 42804, slip op. at 4-5 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 19,
1981)(Cuyahoga County).
... Browne, supra note 5, at 168.
OHIo R. APP. P. 4(A).
38 OHio R. Civ. P. 54(B).
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preme Court's decision in Hensley v. Henry.329 In the syllabus of that
case, the court stated: "Unless plaintiff's Civ. R. 41(A)(1)(a) notice of dis-
missal operates as an adjudication upon the merits under Civ. R.
41(A)(1), it is not a final judgment, order or proceeding, within the mean-
ing of Civ. R. 60(B). '330 The court then went on to note:
Civ. R. 60(B) is restrictive in that it permits the court to grant
relief only from certain "final judgment[s], order[s], or proceed-
ing[s]." (Emphasis added.) Under Civ. R. 41(A)(1), plaintiff's no-
tice of dismissal does not operate 'as an adjudication upon the
merits' because plaintiff had not previously "dismissed in any
court, an action based on *** the same claim," and because the
notice of dismissal did not "otherwise" state that it should so op-
erate. As such, it is not a final judicial determination from which
Civ. R. 60(B) can afford relief.3
3
'
This case, of course, deals with a voluntary dismissal of an action and an
attempt to reinstate it under the provisions of Rule 60(B). It is clear from
what is said above that the decision did not turn upon either of those
factors; rather, in defining finality, the supreme court confused the con-
cept of finality with the bar of res judicata, and in effect, held that no
decision is final unless it raises the bar of res judicata.133
There is no reason to suppose that a voluntary dismissal is any less
final under the provisions of section 2505.02 than an involuntary dismis-
sal, and there is no reason to suppose that the word "final," as it is used
in Civil Rule 60(B), should not be subject to the definition of finality
contained in that statute. Nevertheless, the court could limit this new
definition of finality to voluntary dismissals or to the operation of Civil
Rule 60(B). If it does not and adheres to this new definition of finality as
one that applies across the board, then one would be forced to conclude
that an order striking the complaint from the files for failure of com-
mencement or a claim from a pleading for that reason is not a final, ap-
pealable order because it is not an order that "operates as an adjudication
upon the merits."
"1 61 Ohio St. 2d 277, 400 N.E.2d 1352 (1980).
310 Id. at 277, 400 N.E.2d at 1352.
131 Id. at 279, 400 N.E.2d at 1353 (footnotes omitted).
3'2 What the supreme court probably intended to say was this: Civil Rule 60(B) may only
be used to obtain relief from final judgments, orders, or proceedings. A voluntary dismissal
by notice under the provisions of Civil Rule 41(A)(1)(a) operates automatically upon the
filing of the notice "without order of the court." Perdue v. Handelman, 68 Ohio App. 2d
240, 429 N.E.2d 165 (10th Dist. 1980)(Franklin County). See also Zimmie v. Zimmie, No.
43299, slip op. at 3 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 1983)(Cuyahoga County) ("A notice of
dismissal involves no action by the court; it is not an order of the court.") Therefore, since
there was no order of the court dismissing the action, there cannot be a final order, and
Civil Rule 60(B) has no application. There simply was no order to which the motion for
relief could be directed.
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Unless the Hensley doctrine is limited to voluntary dismissals,333 it will
also pose problems in connection with dismissals under Civil Rule 4(E).
Since a Rule 4(E) dismissal for failure to obtain service within six months
is a dismissal "without prejudice," it does not operate as an adjudication
upon the merits3 4 and would not be a final, appealable order under
Hensley.
B. The Defense Denied
The trial court's order rejecting the defense of failure of commence-
ment will affect the defendant's substantial right to have the litigation
terminated, but it does not determine the action, nor does it prevent the
defendant from obtaining a judgment on the merits in the action. There-
fore, it is not a final order under the provisions of section 2505.02, and
because it is not final, it is not an appealable order under the provisions
of section 2505.03.
Likewise, an order overruling a Rule 4(E) motion to dismiss for failure
to obtain service within six months neither determines the action nor pre-
vents a judgment in favor of the defendant. Therefore, it is not a final,
appealable order. Accordingly, no immediate appeal can be taken from
the rejection of the challenge made under the auspices of Civil Rules 3(A)
or 4(E). That rejection becomes reviewable on appeal, however, when a
final appealable order is entered in the action, and an appeal is taken
therefrom .
33
IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Failure of commencement is an anomalous defense. It is not expressly
mentioned anywhere in the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure; it does not
exist in its own right, but arises out of the existence and validity of some
other Rules' defense, such as lack of jurisdiction over the person, lack of
capacity to sue or be sued, or nonexistence of a party. The nature of the
defense is completely misunderstood by the vast majority of both bench
and bar, and for all practical purposes, it would not exist at all if the Ohio
"I To date, the courts of appeals appear to be either ignoring the Hensley definition of
finality or limiting it to voluntary dismissals. See, e.g., Jordan v. Appelbaum, No. 46675
(Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1983)(Cuyahoga County); Vic Tanny Int'l Inc. v. Car-
rabine, No. 42220 (Ohio 8th Dist. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1981)(Cuyahoga County).
... See cases cited supra note 325.
... See Hollington v. Ricco, 40 Ohio App. 2d 57, 318 N.E.2d 442 (8th Dist.
1973)(Cuyahoga County):
The concept of reviewability is to be distinguished from the concept of appeala-
bility, which focuses on the ripeness of finality of an order or judgment. See 4 Am.
Jur. 2d, Appeal & Error § 47, at 570 (1962). Thus, while an interlocutory order is
normally said to be non-appealable in the sense that it is not final, it does not
follow that it is non-reviewable once an appeal is properly filed.
Id. at 67 n.11, 318 N.E.2d at 449 n.11.
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Rules of Civil Procedure enacted in 1970 did not perpetuate the historical
linkage between commencement and jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.
In 1853, when the statutory predecessor of Civil Rule 3(A) was first
enacted,"3 " there was a real need for that linkage. As one commentator
points out, 33 7 the original statute dealing with commencement chose the
date of service on the defendant as the date of commencement."' 8 Carried
to its logical conclusion, this required service on the defendant before the
statute of limitations applicable to the action expired. This would deny to
the plaintiff the full period of time granted by the statute of limitations.
"I Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Ohio, § 20, 1853 Ohio Laws 57, 60.
331 See Scigliano, supra note 5, at 265-69.
a Section 20 of the 1853 Code of Civil Procedure provided as follows:
An action shall be deemed commenced within the meaning of this title, as to
each defendant, at the date of the summons which is served on him, or on a co-
defendant who is a joint contractor, or otherwise united in interest with him:
where service by publication is proper, the action shall be deemed commenced at
the date of the first publication, which publication must be regularly made.
An attempt to commence an action shall be deemed equivalent to the com-
mencement thereof, within the meaning of this title, when the party faithfully,
properly and diligently, endeavors to procure a service: but such attempt must be
followed by service within sixty days.
1853 Ohio Laws 60.
This section had to be read in conjunction with §§ 55 and 56 of the Code which read:
§ 55. A civil action must be commenced by filing in the office of the clerk of the
proper court, a petition, and causing a summons to be issued thereon.
§ 56. The plaintiff shall, also, file with the clerk of the court, a precipe, stating the
names of the parties to the action, and demanding that a summons issue thereon.
1853 Ohio Laws 66.
Prior to its amendment in 1965, this section had evolved into OHo REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 2305.17 (Page 1954), and read as follows:
An action is commenced within the meaning of sections 2305.03 to 2305.22, in-
clusive, and section 1307.08 of the Revised Code, as to each defendant, at the date
of the summons which is served on him or on a codefendant who is a joint con-
tractor, or otherwise united in interest with him. When service by publication is
proper, the action is commenced at the date of the first publication, if it is regu-
larly made.
Within the meaning of such sections, an attempt to commence an action is
equivalent to its commencement, when the party diligently endeavors to procure a
service, if such attempt is followed by service within sixty days.
By 1965, these provisions had evolved into Oaio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2703.01 and 2703.02
(Baldwin 1964)(repealed 1971):
2703.01 Summons to be issued on petition. A civil action must be commenced
by filing in the office of the clerk of the proper court a petition and causing a
summons to be issued thereon.
2703.02 Precipe. At the time of filing a petition there shall also be filed with the
clerk of the court a praecipe, stating therein the names of the parties to be served
with summons, the nature of the relief sought and if it is for the recovery of
money, the amount for which judgment is asked, with interest, if any, and de-
manding that a summons issue.
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Therefore, a "savings clause" '339 was included in the Code which would
permit commencement within the statute of limitations if the petition
was filed and summons issued before the statute of limitations expired,
and service on the defendant was obtained within sixty days thereafter.
Thus the original Code linked the filing of the petition and the acquisi-
tion of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in order to save an
action that was timely filed, but so late in the statutory period of limita-
tions that service on the defendant could not be acquired before the stat-
ute ran.
With the amendment of the statute in 1965,340 however, that linkage
was no longer required since the amended statute made the date of the
petition's filing the date of commencement. The linkage between filing
and jurisdiction was retained for the purpose of establishing a "failure-to-
prosecute" point beyond which the action should not be continued with-
out jurisdiction over the defendant.3 41 This concept of a "failure-to-prose-
cute" point one year after the filing of the complaint was carried over
into Civil Rule 3(A).3 42
It is this linkage between commencement and the acquisition of juris-
diction over the person of the defendant that has spawned most of the
metaphysical problems discussed in the previous sections of this Article,
and it is the basis for that anomalous concept of an "action attempted to
be commenced." However, since 1965, when the date of commencement
was transferred from the date of service on the defendant to the date the
petition was filed with the court, there has been no inherent need to link
commencement with jurisdiction, and the linkage that does now exist in
Civil Rule 3(A) is nothing more than an accident of history.
This becomes obvious when one considers Civil Rule 4(E), which estab-
lishes a six-month "failure-to-prosecute" point which is completely di-
vorced from commencement. Indeed, Rule 4(E)'s six-month "failure-to-
prosecute" point renders Rule 3(A)'s one-year "failure-to-prosecute"
point redundant, and the continued co-existence of two different "failure-
to-prosecute" points must necessarily produce further confusion in an
area that is already widely misunderstood. Therefore, since the advent of
Rule 4(E), there is no longer any need for Rule 3(A)'s linkage between
commencement and jurisdiction, and the bench and bar would be better
off if it did not exist.
Its elimination is simple; all that would be required is an amendment of
Rule 3(A) so that it would read as follows: "A civil action is commenced
"' The "savings clause" is the second paragraph of § 20 of the original Code of Civil
Procedure, and the second paragraph of OmIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.17 (Page 1954), as it
read prior to its amendment in 1965. See supra note 338.
Act of July 16, 1965, 1965 Ohio Laws 1675, 646. See text accompanying note 17 for the
language of the amended section.
341 See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
342 Id.
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by filing a complaint with the court." While this would not eliminate the
defense of failure of commencement, it would so reduce the occasions for
its use that the defense would become statistically insignificant. Further,
and perhaps more importantly, it would completely eliminate the absurd-'
ity of an "action attempted to be commenced." Finally, the failure to
prosecute problem arising from the plaintiffs failure to obtain jurisdic-
tion over the person of the defendant would be resolved under the provi-
sion of the new Rule 4(E), and the problems of commencement and fail-
ure to prosecute would no longer be intertwined as they now are.
This is not to say that Rule 4(E) is perfect; when used in conjunction
with section 2305.19, the "savings statute," it can be manipulated in such
a way as to extend effectively the statute of limitations by anywhere from
eighteen months to two years and perhaps longer.343 However, a new Rule
3(A), combined with the imperfect Rule 4(E), is preferable to the chaotic
situation that now exists, since it would not only bring the Ohio Rules
more in line with their federal counterparts but it would also eliminate
almost all of the confusion that now surrounds the concept of commence-
ment. "Commencement" ought to be a spare and simple concept com-
pletely unrelated to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. It can be if Rule 3(A) is amended to read: "An action is com-
menced by filing a complaint with the court."
"' Browne, supra note 5, at 168.
[Vol. 33:245
78https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol33/iss2/5
